

11-25-2020

## Perspectives on Shame among Palestinian Women

Andrea Sakleh

Follow this and additional works at: <https://scholarsjunction.msstate.edu/td>

---

### Recommended Citation

Sakleh, Andrea, "Perspectives on Shame among Palestinian Women" (2020). *Theses and Dissertations*. 3514.

<https://scholarsjunction.msstate.edu/td/3514>

This Graduate Thesis - Open Access is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at Scholars Junction. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Scholars Junction. For more information, please contact [scholcomm@msstate.libanswers.com](mailto:scholcomm@msstate.libanswers.com).

Perspectives on shame among Palestinian women

By

Andrea Sakleh

Approved by:

Kate McClellan (Major Professor)  
Hsain Ilahiane  
Kimberly Kelly  
Molly Zuckerman (Graduate Coordinator)  
Rick Travis (Dean, College of Arts & Sciences)

A Thesis  
Submitted to the Faculty of  
Mississippi State University  
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements  
for the Degree of Master of Arts  
in Applied Anthropology  
in the Department of Anthropology and Middle Eastern Cultures

Mississippi State, Mississippi

November 2020

Copyright by  
Andrea Sakleh  
2020

Name: Andrea Sakleh

Date of Degree: November 25, 2020

Institution: Mississippi State University

Major Field: Applied Anthropology

Major Professor: Kate McClellan

Title of Study: Perspectives on shame among Palestinian women

Pages in Study 106

Candidate for Degree of Master of Arts

This thesis will examine the ways in which Palestinian women in Ramallah experience and think about shame (*eib*). I will approach this topic with the intention of complicating the traditional anthropological narrative regarding the honor/shame dichotomy. Within studies focused on honor and shame in the Middle East, anthropologists have examined the ways that honor and shame impact men and women (Abu-Lughod 1986; Baxter 2007; Glick et.al. 2016; Harik & Marston 1996; Kanaaneh 2002; Rasmussen 2007; Zoepf 2016), yet rarely are the two concepts, especially shame, examined independently. Overarchingly, I wish to understand what Palestinian women in Ramallah think about shame, how shame manifests in their daily lives, how it is enforced, and how and why shame ideologies have shifted across generations of Palestinian women.

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I first want to thank my family (Mom, Baba, Melissa, Sami, Teta, Sido, and Khalto) for their unwavering support over the last few years. Without it, I wouldn't be where I am now. I next want to thank my major professor Kate McClellan and my committee members Hsain Ilahiane and Kimberly Kelly for helping me shape this project and for their continued insight. I next want to thank my friends Moe and Drea for always supporting me and being the best friends I could ever wish for. I want to thank my family in Ramallah for being gracious hosts to me for the last two years. I next want to thank Rana and Darlene Mufarreh, who were instrumental in the success of this thesis. I finally want to thank every single Palestinian woman who openly shared their stories with me, I will be forever grateful.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.....	ii
LIST OF TABLES.....	v
CHAPTER	
I. INTRODUCTION.....	1
Thesis Research Questions.....	3
History of Ramallah & Palestine.....	5
The Anthropology of Palestine.....	12
Gender in the Middle East.....	15
<i>Eib</i> (or Shame).....	18
Methods.....	19
Participant Observation.....	19
Interviews.....	21
Intergenerational Approach.....	21
Data Analysis.....	25
Ethnographies of the Particular.....	25
II. GENDER AND <i>EIB</i> .....	28
Religion and <i>Eib</i> .....	39
Marriage and Sexuality.....	41
Conclusion.....	45
III. SPACE, PLACE, AND BODY.....	47
Space and Place.....	47
Bodies as Space.....	60
Conclusion.....	62
IV. GENERATIONAL CHANGES.....	63
Globalization.....	64
Technology.....	67
Education.....	71
Economy.....	76
Inner-Community Change.....	79

Conclusion .....	86
V. CONCLUSION .....	89
REFERENCES .....	97
APPENDIX	
A. APPENDIX A .....	105

## LIST OF TABLES

Table 1	Interview Questions .....	106
---------	---------------------------	-----



## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

This thesis will examine the ways in which Palestinian women in Ramallah experience and think about shame (*eib*)<sup>1</sup>. I will approach this topic with the intention of complicating the traditional anthropological narrative regarding the honor/shame dichotomy. Within studies focused on honor and shame in the Middle East, anthropologists have examined the ways that honor and shame impact men and women (Abu-Lughod 1986; Baxter 2007; Glick et.al. 2016; Harik & Marston 1996; Kanaaneh 2002; Rasmussen 2007; Zoepf 2016), yet rarely are the two concepts, especially shame, examined independently. Overarchingly, I wish to understand what Palestinian women in Ramallah think about shame, how shame manifests in their daily lives, how it is enforced, and how and why shame ideologies have shifted across generations of Palestinian women.

Women in the Middle East, and Arab women more specifically, have become a point of anthropological inquiry within the last 40 years. In the 1980's anthropologists began to shift their focus away from theories revolving around segmentation, or tribalism, to other aspects of Middle Eastern society (Abu-Lughod 1989). Within the segmentation narrative, "women either are not considered at all or are viewed as that which men must protect or defend to maintain their own honor" (Abu-Lughod 1989, 285). This emphasis on tribalism is not surprising, as early

---

<sup>1</sup> I will use the Arabic word *eib* along with the English word shame interchangeably throughout this thesis. *Eib* is a word that refers to shame in Arab societies. Although it is either spelled "*eib*" or "*ayb*", for this thesis, I will use the spelling "*eib*"

anthropological work focused on the Middle East prioritized topics that advanced colonial agendas, which often translated to the association of men with politics in Western societies (Abu-Lughod, 1989). Orientalist ideologies also contributed to the exotification of Arabs and the Middle East, not only by social scientists but all dominating western powers (Said, 1978). Due to orientalist ideals, women were studied through the lens of their male community members and their lives were not examined in any nuanced manner.

Orientalist and colonial ideologies imparted on the Middle East left little room for research that explored anything that did not directly contribute to their perpetuation. However, this era of research began to subside within anthropology with the introduction of feminist research in Middle Eastern focused studies. With its coming of age in the 1980's, feminist anthropology's appearance in literature about the Middle East was mainly due to the growing presence of women researchers in the field (Abu-Lughod 1989; Deeb & Winegar 2012). The intervention of research on women in the Middle East exposed the biases that were present in previous research. Feminist anthropology encouraged research that took the lives and activities of women seriously, which has produced work that shows the "rich and varied character" of women's realities (Abu-Lughod 1989; Deeb & Winegar 2012).

However, within ethnographic writing, Arab women are still studied through the dichotomous framework of the honor/shame complex. The "honor code" which has circulated in academic discourse is a combination of both cognitive and pragmatic components (Abu-Lughod 1986; Baxter 2007). Referencing Paul Friedrich's (1977) work, Abu-Lughod draws upon two aspects of his configuration of honor: "In the first aspect it is 'a system of symbols, values, and definitions in terms of which phenomena are conceptualized and interpreted.' In the second, honor guides and motivates acts 'organized in terms of categories, rules, and processes that are,

to a significant degree, specific to a given culture...” (Abu-Lughod 1986, 86). Not abiding by the honor code results in shame for both the individual and family (Abu-Lughod 1986; Baxter 2007). This research aims to veer away from this rhetoric because the manifestation of shame in the daily lives of Palestinian women does not necessarily reference or present itself in a larger symbolic framework. With this research, I aim to move beyond the “honor code” complex by examining the specific ways that Palestinian women interact and negotiate shame in their daily lives. This will allow for a more precise understanding of shame on a micro-level. With this thesis, I will look at shame through the three angels of gender, space, and generational changes in an attempt to understand how shame is experienced and thought about by Palestinian women.

### **Thesis Research Questions**

This research aims to understand the complexities of shame ideologies in Palestine through the perspectives of three generations of Palestinian women. Using data which was collected through fieldwork conducted in the Summer of 2019 in Ramallah, I will explore how Palestinian women in Ramallah think about shame, how shame manifests in their daily lives, how it is enforced, and how and why shame ideologies have shifted across generations of Palestinian women. This thesis will be split into three chapters: gender & *eib*, space & place, and generational changes. Throughout these three parts, I will address my overarching research questions:

- (1) How and why have shame ideologies in Palestine shifted across time and how do these shifts affect different generations of women in different ways?
- (2) How do shame ideologies affect Palestinian women’s daily lives, including ways in which they embody shame? By the ways which women embody shame in their daily lives, I mean the

ways which shame ideologies manifest and present themselves to women outside of just language and thought. Essentially, I want to understand when ideology affects daily action.

(3) How are shame ideologies enforced and contested?

The notions of shame that have been examined in previous anthropological research in the broader Middle Eastern region have mainly focused on its interaction with honor (Abu-Lughod 1986, 1989; Baxter 2007; Deeb & Winegar 2012). Particularly, shame was examined within the parameters of the “honor code,” which interprets honor as an “attribute or ideal exclusively of men” (Abu-Lughod 1989, 285). With this research, I aim to divert from the traditional narrative regarding shame and honor. I want to examine the way shame, as an independent phenomenon, affects the lives of Palestinian women living in Ramallah. Rarely are shame and honor studied outside of the dichotomy that anthropologists have situated them within. With this research, I aim to critique the previously established theoretical foundations that honor and shame have been built upon. The particular theoretical objective of this research is to critique the structuralist theoretical framework that honor and shame have been situated since the early 1980’s. Structuralism, which was coined by anthropologists Claude Levi-Strauss, stresses importance of examining the relations between phenomena, rather than the specific phenomenon itself (Strauss 2008). In this sense, this work calls upon some post-structuralist ideas by analyzing shame as an individual phenomenon. However, I believe this research moves past a post-structuralist analysis and looks at shame in a new lens.

As well, shame is rarely, if ever, examined outside of the context of Islam (Abu-Lughod 1986, 1989; Baxter 2007; Glick et.al. 2016; Harik & Marston 1996; Kanaaneh 2002; Rasmussen 2007; Zoepf 2016). Abu-Lughod (1989) succinctly describes why this practice is problematic by stating “the anthropology of Islam cannot stand for the anthropology of the Arab world. Not just

because not all Arabs are Muslims, nor all Muslims Arabs, but because not all practices and discourses in Arab societies refer or relate to an Islamic tradition” (Abu-Lughod 1989, 294). With this research, I will examine shame outside of the context of religion and try to understand what Arab Palestinian women, as multifaceted people, think about shame. As Ramallah is a religiously diverse city, with both Muslims and Christians coexisting within its boundaries, I felt it was inappropriate to exclude women based on their particular religious beliefs. With that being said, one other objective of this research is to understand how shame ideologies manifest in the lives of all Palestinian women, regardless of their religious beliefs. I did, however, listen to/ attend to the ways religion plays a role in women’s lives and have incorporated these religious influences into my analysis.

### **History of Ramallah & Palestine**

This thesis attempts to complicate the traditional shame/honor complex through the ethnographic study of Palestinian women’s lives in Ramallah. I chose to focus this thesis in Palestine, and specifically Ramallah, because my family has resided in Ramallah for the last 500 years and I have a deep-rooted connection with the area. Ramallah is a town that is not often found within anthropological literature, but when it is, it is usually written about through the lens of the Israeli occupation<sup>2</sup>. As well, within early anthropology, Palestine was notably absent from research inquiries (Furani & Rabinowitz 2011). Traditionally, anthropologists only considered Morocco, North Yemen, Egypt and sparsely located areas as “prestige zones” in the Middle East (Deeb & Winegar 2012). However, Palestine may be a new prestige zone because of the

---

<sup>2</sup> Throughout this thesis I will refer to the Israeli occupation in a few different ways. I use the terms “Israeli occupation,” “occupation,” and “apartheid.” Although the term “apartheid” is usually only seen in connection with South Africa, Israel has been defined as an apartheid state by sects of the United Nations. Specifically, the UN Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA) stated that “Israel has established an apartheid regime that dominates the Palestinian people as a whole” (Erakat 2019, 14).

concentrated anthropological focus on the country (Deeb & Winegar 2012). When Palestine did enter the academic periphery, it was “defined almost exclusively by the violence of Israeli occupation” (Deeb & Winegar 2012, 539). This pivot towards Palestine was in part a result of the tumultuous political reality that began in the 1990: the first intifada, the Oslo Accord, and the second intifada.

Still, anthropological work focused on Palestine since the late 1980’s has epistemologically adhered to the notion that nationhood, conflict, identity, and the state are the main subjects that should be addressed in the Palestinian question (Deeb & Winegar 2012; Furani & Rabinowitz 2011). Even when focusing on gender, researchers have addressed “gender ideologies or gendered spatial practices in the context of conflict, nationalism, and violence” (Deeb & Winegar 2012, 543). With this in mind, a larger aim of this research is to move away from the traditional narrative that exists on Palestine within anthropological discourse. Although the Israeli occupation is a hegemonic force within the lives of Palestinians in both the West Bank and Gaza, it is not the only determining factor in individuals’ daily functioning.

It is important to first understand the historical context of the geographic location in which this research was conducted. Ramallah, which is now regarded as a metropolitan hub in the West Bank, is located 9 miles north of Jerusalem, 39 miles from the Mediterranean, and 32 miles from the Dead Sea (Hammoudeh 2014). Within early historical accounts, Ramallah was established as a Crusader settlement that later became a Muslim village during the Mamluk period (Hammoudeh 2014). However, during these periods, there is little evidence that the land was fully occupied or used as more than farmland. During the Ottoman rule in the sixteenth century, Ramallah transformed into a Christian village with the arrival of the Haddadin and Naqash families. Traditional narratives and Ottoman census records support evidence that

Ramallah's founding at this time was orchestrated by "the five sons (Haddad, Ibrahim, Jiryis, Shuqayr, and Hassan) of Rashid al-Haddadin, a Christian from an area near Karak in Transjordan" (Hammoudeh 2014, 38).

The name "Ramallah" derives from an Aramaic word consisting of two parts. The first is the word "Ram," which is "derived from the word Rama, which means height or elevation" (Hammoudeh 2014, 38). The second part of the word, "Allah," means God in both Aramaic and Arabic. Therefore, Ramallah, based on Aramaic roots is translated to mean the "Mount of God" (Hammoudeh 2014). This name is distinctly appropriate due to Ramallah's elevation of 860 meters above sea level, making it situated 60 meters higher than Jerusalem. Ramallah is located in the mountains surrounding Jerusalem, making it part of the mountain range of central Palestine which extends from southern Galilee to Hebron (Hammoudeh 2014, 38). Ramallah is located "west of the main commercial routes through Palestine's central mountains, [which links] Nablus and Hebron by way of Jerusalem" led to the city's late development (Hammoudeh 2014, 38).

Although immigration into Ramallah did happen in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century, the number of internally displaced people increased drastically due to the 1948 Nakba, the Arabic word for "catastrophe" that Palestinians and others use to refer to the events of 1948. The Nakba resulted in the displacement and deaths of over 750,000 Palestinians. After the war, many people from the coastal region, specifically cities such as Jaffa and Haifa, migrated to areas in Gaza and the West Bank. According to Jordan census, 13,500 inhabitants of Ramallah in 1953 were refugees (Taraki 2008). The majority of refugees that came to Ramallah after the Nakba came from villages that were near al-Lidd, Ramla, and Jaffa. These refugees predominantly settled in refugee camps surrounding Ramallah. At the same time, the Nakba accelerated the emigration of

Ramallah natives, which was supported by the favorable change in American immigration policy at the time.

Currently, Ramallah is the undisputed political and cultural center of the West Bank (Taraki 2008). After the second intifada (2000 to 2005) Ramallah became an Arab city (although smaller in scale) that is comparable to cities such as Amman, Cairo, and Beirut. With Ramallah's population only being around 60,000, within the last 15 years there has been an increase in "social heterogeneity of the population; the growing social disparities and their normalization; and the globalized, modernist urban ethos articulated by the new middle class" (Taraki 2008, 7). With the increased violence from Israeli forces directed on Ramallah during the time of the second intifada and after, the city gained a reputation of being a "five-star prison" on account of the numerous arrests by Israeli forces that happened on a daily basis. However, in recent years this has changed. Ramallah is now viewed as an "oasis of normalcy (and decadence) in a desolate landscape of shattered urban spaces and violated rural expanses" (Taraki 2008, 7).

Although this thesis will not focus on the Israeli occupation, I believe it is important that I highlight facets of larger Palestinian political history to better situate the realities in which my interlocutors live. This inclusion is also added to help create a more concise understanding of terminology which will be used throughout this thesis that directly pertain to Palestinian history. Beginning in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century and early 20<sup>th</sup> century, Palestine was a territorial domain within the Ottoman Empire, yet it was autonomously governed much like the rest of the Eastern Arab provenances within the Ottoman State (Abu-Lughod 1988, 194-5). The geopolitical name of Palestine was the product of British colonialism, particularly when the British Mandate was established in 1922 (Abu-Lughod 1988, 195). Preceding the mandate, Britain and France created the Sykes-Picot agreement in 1916, which carved the Eastern Arab Provenance of the Ottoman



Empire. France gained control of what is now Syria and Lebanon and Britain was allotted what is now Iraq, Jordan, and Palestine (Abu-Lughod 1988, 195). These agreements catered only to the geopolitical determinates of France and Britain, leaving the region's people out of their decisions. The geopolitical instability that the agreement created caused the Britain to create a precise definition of Palestine once they gained power of the region. This was necessary because there were so many conflicting commitments associated with the region (Abu-Lughod 1988).

Along with the Sykes-Picot agreement, the British made a promise to the Sharif Husayn of Mecca when he declared the Arab Revolt of 1915. This deal would have entailed the establishment of an Independent Arab Peninsula, which included Palestine (Abu-Lughod 1988). However, the British created the Balfour Declaration with the Zionists, essentially negating any promise made to the Arabs. The Zionist Organization contested Britain's exclusion of Jordan, or Transjordan, within the definition of Palestine. By doing this, the Zionists created discourse that argued that Israel would only be a small part of Palestine, which in reality was the entirety of Palestine (Abu-Lughod 1988). Their argument was that a Jewish state would be established in "Western Palestine" and the Arabs could have "East Palestine," aka Jordan (Abu-Lughod 1988, 199). Zionists arguments stated that Palestine was a land without people, and the Jewish people were people without land, so naturally the land known as Palestine should go to them. However, when confronted with the reality that there were people who occupied this land, Zionists imputed certain "qualities" to the population in order to justify either subordination or "transfer" (Abu-Lughod 1988, 201). The identity of the inhabitants of Palestine was used as a tactic to delegitimize and undermine the people to project the Zionist movements agenda. The term Arab was used to refer to Palestinian people, but it was shrouded with negative connotations. By referring to them as Arabs, Zionist created a picture of uncivilized, underdeveloped, and nomadic

(Abu-Lughod 1988, 201). Another tactic that was used was to ignore the identity of the inhabitants all together. The people were spoken about as if they did not have either a culture or national identity. This delegitimized the people in question in order to strip them of their political rights.

An important index of the success of this concerted effort to deny the Palestinian/Arab identity of the affected population or to undervalue it is the omission of any reference in the Belfour Declaration to either a national or cultural designation of Palestine's population whose civil and religious rights were to be protected by its terms: on the other hand the Declaration was very specific about the Jewish people. (Abu-Lughod 1988, 201).

Both the Zionist/Israel and British colonial forces determined that the Palestinian people's identity rested in the larger heritage of the Arab people and any self-expression on the Palestinian front could be channeled through the larger Arab framework (Abu-Lughod 1988, 201). Although it is accurate to refer to Palestinians as Arabs, Zionist organizers would use their Arab identity to paint them as anti-democratic, authoritarian, fanatical (religious or national), and anti-Semitic. This contrasts with the research historians have conducted on the Palestinian people. Middle Eastern historians have noted that "Palestine, regardless of its geographic expanse is, and has been, part of the Arab region; its people have been largely Arab in terms of cultural identity since the seventh century" (Abu-Lughod 1988, 202). They go on to state that Palestinians, regardless of their religious background, are both Arabs and people of a specific land.

The culmination of the geopolitical debates about Palestine that took place in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century was the 1948 war. In 1948, the Nakba was when thousands of Palestinians were forced from their homes in order to create the state of Israel (Abu-Lughod and Sa'di 2007, 1). Eighty percent of the Palestinians who lived in the areas that were overtaken by Israeli forces,

which was about 77 percent of Palestine, became refugees (Abu-Lughod and Sa'di 2007, 3). More than 700,000 Palestinians were displaced while many more were outright killed (Abu-Lughod 2007; Haddad, 2001). The Palestinians who did stay, around 60,000 to 156,000 people, became nominal citizens who were “subject to a separate system of military administration by a government that also confiscated the bulk of their land” (Abu-Lughod and Sa'di 2007, 3). The Palestinians in the West Bank came under the uncaring rule of the Hashemites, the rulers of Jordan, and the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip came under the equally repressive Egyptian administration (Abu-Lughod and Sa'di 2007, 3). This continued until 1967 when Israel placed both regions under military occupation (Abu-Lughod and Sa'di 2007, 3). The Nakba for the Palestinian people represents dramatic and irreversible change that affected people on an individual, community, and national level. However, globally, these events were celebrated as the rebirth of the Jewish people following their persecution in Europe and subjection to the Nazi genocide (Abu-Lughod and Sa'di 2007, 4). The narrative adapted by the international community and Israel itself excludes the Palestinian people altogether and disregards the brutal tactics used by Israeli forces to achieve their goal. Palestinian historian Elias Sanbar expertly articulates the exclusion of power Palestinian people experience:

The contemporary history of the Palestinians turns on a key date: 1948. That year, a country and its people disappeared from maps and dictionaries... ‘The Palestinian people does not exist,’ said the new masters, and henceforth the Palestinians would be referred to by general, conveniently vague terms, as either ‘refugees.’ Or in the case of a small minority that had managed to escape the generalized expulsion, ‘Israeli Arabs.’ A long absence was beginning (Sanbar 2001, 87).

The Nakba is often viewed as the beginning of contemporary Palestinian history and the point of reference for other events, both past and present (Abu-Lughod and Sa'di 2007, 5). It is the marker for a history of “catastrophic changes, violent suppression, and refusal to disappear”

(Abu-Lughod & Sa'di 2007, 5). Landmark events in Palestinian history are measured from the Nakba. For instance, the Belfour Declaration only gained significance after the Nakba. Events such as “Black September (Jordan, 1970), the massacre at Sabra and Shatila (Lebanon, 1982), Land Day (Israel, 1976), and the first and second intifadas (1987-1993; 2000-present) would not have occurred if they had not been preceded by the Nakba” (Abu-Lughod and Sa'di 2007, 5).

### **The Anthropology of Palestine**

According to Furani and Rabinowitz (2011), the ethnographic arrival of Palestine within the discipline of anthropology occurred in four stages. The first was what they term “Biblical Palestine,” which was the biblical rediscovery of the region that ultimately triggered more European writing on Palestine within the nineteenth century (Doumani 1992; Furani and Rabinowitz 2011). As they explain, “this conjuring of biblical time objectified contemporary Palestinians as living fossils, [creating] a historiography that serves Europeans” (Furani and Rabinowitz 2011, 478). The next stage of ethnographic writing on Palestine is the “Oriental Palestine,” which contextualized Palestine as the cradle of Christianity and the contemporary Orient (Furani and Rabinowitz 2011; Rabinowitz 2002; Said 1978, Said 1979). The third stage was “Absent Palestine” where “western discourse on Palestine was ‘determined largely by images, themes, and values that projected the Jewish Zionist version of history... [and] was untouched and unaffected by the Palestinian Arab version of history’” (Furani and Rabinowitz 2011, 480). Finally, the last stage is the “Poststructural,” a term that describes a new wave of anthropologists who question Israeli efforts to repress Palestinian nationalism (Furani and Rabinowitz 2011, 481). It is important to understand the ways in which Palestine has been analyzed in the past to understand how modern interpretations of Palestine are being used a corrective to already established literature.

As stated previously, work on Palestine is almost exclusively examined through the lens of the Israeli occupation (Deeb & Winegar 2012). Rarely have Palestinian people and culture been examined outside of the parameters of the occupation, leading to a limited representation of Palestinians (Abu-Lughod 2007; Abufarha 2009; Georgis 2007; Jabareen 2013; Nofal et.al. 1998; Sa'di 2002; Khalidi 2014). Ethnographic work in Palestine, focused on a variety of topics, such as gender and politics (Abdo 1999; Baxter 2007; Rockwell 1985; Peteet 1986; Stein and Swedenburg 2004), humanitarianism, development, and the refugee crisis (al-Husseini 2000; Allen 2013; Challand 2006; Farsakh 2016; Feldman 2018; Gabiam 2012; Haddad 2001; Quarmout & Beland 2012; Taghdisi-Rad 2015), and nationalism, space, and medicine (Hammoudeh et.al. 2016; Jefferis 2012; Kanaaneh 2002; Rassin et.al. 2009; Shalhoub-Kevorkian 2012; Shalhoub-Kevorkian 2015; Slyomovics 1998; Swedenberg 1995) has been firmly anchored within the context of the Israeli occupation. In other words, Palestine has been studied mainly as a product of colonial rule and imperialism. However, as with the rest of the Middle East, Palestine has been subject to more a traditional anthropological lens. Abu-Lughod (1989) states that the “foci of work in Middle East anthropology [is the] result of the interaction of the particularities of the Middle East situation with the general romanticism of anthropology and is uneasy sense that since most of its analytical tools were honed in simple societies they are unwieldy if not useless in different sorts of contexts” (Abu-Lughod 1989, 279). The specific aspect of the Middle East which she is addressing is the romanticized picture that was presented by colonial powers who sought control of the region, which many refer to as Orientalism.

Edward Said coined the term “Orientalism” to describe this exotification of Arabs and the Middle East. By placing a name to the phenomenon, Said shed light on the misconceptions and misinformation social scientists take as fact within their research. Said’s objective is to correct

the fallacies that encompass earlier academic literature pertaining to the Middle East. The “Orient” has been assumed to be an inherent fact of nature, so embedded within western ideology that the west has codified the “Orient’s” existence (Said 1978a, 4). “The Orient was Orientalized not only because it was discovered to be ‘Oriental’ in all those ways considered commonplace by an average nineteenth-century European, but also because it *could be* – that is, submitted to being – *made Oriental*” (Said 1978a, 5-6). The lives of Middle Eastern people have been molded and crafted by the western powers who dominated them, essentially making them caricatures of people. Said states that Orientalism is essentially “a distribution of geopolitical awareness into aesthetic, scholarly, economic, sociological, historical, and philosophical texts” (Said 1978a, 12). Orientalism can be attributed to the romanticism placed on the Middle East and its people by the West (Deeb & Winegar 2012, 538). Arabs were depicted as exotic savages who create culture but do not know how to apply their creation to the world. This narrative was embedded in anthropological research on the Middle East for a long time, and it is only in recent years that anthropologists questioned its validity.

Orientalist notions are present when examining Palestine’s interactions with the West. Said explains that “for the west, Palestine has been a place where a relatively advanced (because European) population of Jews has performed miracles of construction and civilizing, fought brilliantly successful technical wars against dumb, essentially repellent, uncivilized Arab natives” (Said 1978b, 4). The history of anti-Arab rhetoric and prejudice that is prioritized by the West has helped advance Orientalist beliefs. Orientalist beliefs have contributed to making a simple perception of Arabs into a highly politicized matter, meaning Oriental ideologies in the West have made the “Arab” a political entity (Said 1978a). Palestinians experience the repercussions of Orientalist beliefs to an extreme degree. There exists “an almost unanimous

consensus that politically [the Palestinians do] not exist, and when allowed that [they do], it is either as a nuisance or as an Oriental” (Said 1978a, 27).

Despite the growing efforts within the discipline, anthropologists are still attempting to combat the exoticization/ othering of Palestinians. This occurs through the continued work focused on the conflict and political realities of the Palestinians and is especially true when Palestinian women are the focus of these studies. The “web of racism, cultural stereotypes, political imperialism, [and] dehumanization ideology” that hold the imagination of the west regarding Palestinians is present too in academia (Said 1978a, 27). Focusing anthropological inquiry primarily on the violence inflicted in Palestinians by the West, allows for a permanent picture to be painted of a dichotomous violent and victimized Palestinian. This portrayal of Palestinians, particularly Palestinian women, allows for an Orientalized otherness to cloud academic writing. Although it attempts to counter traditional notions of Orientalist writing, today’s writing on the conflict just perpetuates it in new ways. With this research, I combat this framework by better understanding Palestinian women’s lives outside of the conflict. Although orientalist ideologies are still present within western perception and policies regarding the Middle East, anthropologists must take the next step to help eradicate their perpetuation.

### **Gender in the Middle East**

According to Deeb & Winegar (2012), there are two key interventions that have informed the vast majority of work on gender in the Middle East in recent years. The first “explores the ways that women’s education, new family formation, and liberal feminism have not only shaped the experience of modernity for women, but also highlighted women’s centrality to projects of modernity” (Deeb & Winegar 2012, 542). The second intervention “focuses on the ways women are often positioned as bearers of tradition or barometers of modernity” (Deeb & Winegar 2012,

542). Modernity is a persistent theme within anthropology of the Middle East because of past Orientalist tendencies within the discipline (Said 1978). For the past few decades, scholars studying in the Middle East have used Said's orientalist design to posit "women as cultural icons or symbols of Middle Eastern society" (Hale 2009, 136). This was traditionally done to demonstrate and support the already established ideology that demonstrates Middle Eastern individuals' backwardness and creates a dichotomous relationship between the East/West (Deeb & Wineger 2012; Hale 2009; Inhorn 2014).

The rise of feminist anthropological critique in the 1970s/1980s shifted anthropological knowledge of gender in the Middle East. Arab women went from being portrayed as submissive members of their communities to active, autonomous contributors. A large part of this shifting framework is attributed to anthropologists focusing on Arab women's individual stories, as opposed to consolidating women into one hegemonic category of the "Arab woman." One of the earliest feminist ethnographies that centered on the lives of women in the Middle East is *Veiled Sentiments* by Lila Abu-Lughod (1986). In *Veiled Sentiments*, Abu-Lughod portrays the lives of women in the Egyptian Bedouin tribal community, the Awlad 'Ali, through the examination of their use of poetry to express their personal feelings regarding gender relations and morality. This ethnography was groundbreaking because Abu-Lughod was able to create such an intimate look into Awlad 'Ali women's lives, showing their autonomy and humanity. Abu-Lughod's analysis of the particular stories told by the Awlad 'Ali women helps to inform the larger narrative of Arab women in the Middle East.

Subsequent ethnographic work regarding Arab women has directed its lens towards the more nuanced and multifaceted realities that encompass women's lives. Anthropological work conducted on Arab women today is put forth with the "desire to counter stereotypes about Arab



and Muslim women (which have been amplified by War on Terror rhetoric)” and with the momentum of the “broader feminization of anthropology” (Deeb & Winegar 2012, 542). Work on gender in the Middle East now attends to power in its multiple forms and scales (Baxter 2007; Deeb & Winegar 2012; Fadlalla 2007; Yegenoglu 1998). For example, the political situation in Palestine has pushed scholars to address gender ideologies or gendered spatial practices in the context of conflict, nationalism, and violence (Abdo 1999; Baxter 2007; Deeb & Winegar 2012; Rockwell 1985; Peteet 1986; Slyomovics 1998). Overarchingly, “feminist theory has both inspired and benefited from Middle East anthropologists’ analyses of the effects of colonialism and neocolonialism on women’s lives and crucial interventions into liberal feminist discussions of key topics, including women’s agency and violence against women” (Deeb & Winegar 2012, 542). However, discussions involving a global feminism often have been spearheaded by scholars who are either born, trained, or work in the West (Hale 2009).

Abu-Lughod (1989) points out a few theoretical developments regarding the anthropology of Arab women. She states that as anthropologists have shifted to taking women and their activities seriously, there has been a transformation in understanding women’s worlds. This work includes a richer depiction of women’s relationships to one another, their children, and the “men with whom they interact” (Abu-Lughod 1989, 290). Through this theoretical development, anthropologists have realized that Arab women are actors in their social world, as opposed to the passive characters they were traditionally portrayed as. Abu-Lughod discusses how in early anthropological inquiry there was a focus on “harem theory,” which focused on theory about women, gender, and sexuality. She uses “harem” provocatively in this case, “both to denote the women’s world and women’s activities and to connote an older, orientalist, imaginative world of Middle Eastern women, which shape[d] anthropological discourse by

providing a negative foil” (Abu-Lughod 1989, 288). However, she explains that theoretical developments in the area of Arab women has allowed for the deconstruction of the “harem.” This deconstruction has allowed for the revelation that “analytical categories [focusing on the anthropological insight of Arab women] often conceal[ed] Western cultural notions” (Abu-Lughod 1989, 291).

Palestinian women, in particular, have been subject to Orientalist objectification. The portrayal of Palestinian women in media has framed women as the “womb of the nation” and depicted them as either passive or subordinate participants in society (Jamal 2004; Kanaaneh 2002). Amal Jamal (2004) succinctly explains that Palestinian women are either seen as the mother of the nation, mother of the martyrs, or as housewives (Jamal 2004; Jean-Klein 2000). For Palestinians, land is personified to embody the Palestinian woman and women are meant to be an extension of the national struggle (Slyomovics 1998). Although their voices are left out of the dominant national narrative, ethnographic work on Palestinian women in the context of the national struggle has shed light on their contributions apart from their roles as mother and daughters (Peteet 1986; Peteet & Harlow 1991). However, the future of anthropological work on Palestinian women must function both in and beyond the context of the occupation.

### ***Eib (or Shame)***

Within anthropology of the Middle East, most literature on the shame/honor complex has focused on social structures and culture rather than psychodynamic processes (Joseph 1994; Scheff 2000). The larger framework of honor and shame has traditionally been understood as a cultural code, or a set of “normative representations aimed at the regulation of (inter)action” (Latreille 2008, 599). Gilmore (1987), working on the gendered dynamics of small villages in the Mediterranean, claims that the honor/shame “syndrome” regulates both inter- and intrasex

relations. However, this classification of the honor/shame dichotomy has been problematized and reanalyzed throughout the years (Abu-Lughod 2007; Baxter 2007; Latreille 2008; Pina-Cabral 1989; Stewart 2015). Generally, the traditionally rigid dichotomous relationship between honor and shame has been conceptualized and expressed in writing through phrases such as “women’s separate worlds’,” “gap between the sexes,” or “women’s subsociety” (Latreille 2008, 600). When put in these terms, social scientists have determined that women do not fully participate in what they deem as the larger hegemonic culture. This negates any impact and negotiation women have on the functioning of their lives and cultures. However, to fully understand the honor/shame dichotomy, it first must be pulled apart.

Often, honor and shame are framed within anthropological studies as an either-or phenomenon. As in, either you have shame, or you have honor. However, in reality, I found that it is not that simple: the superficial simplicity of these two phenomena comes from the fact that they have been framed as a dichotomy. Though both honor and shame are important to the understanding of Arab society, I suggest they should not be looked at in tandem all of the time. For example, the absence of shame in women’s lives in Palestine does not necessarily equate familial honor. In reality, the absence of shame just creates a neutrality that most people exist within. Families can have “honorable” reputations, but that does not necessarily always go hand and hand with shame. As I will show later, shame is responsible for the actions, thoughts, and functioning of women in Palestinian society, whereas honor is not.

## **Methods**

### **Participant Observation**

Participant observation is an essential methodological step towards understanding ways that shame manifests within Palestinian women’s daily lives because it allows for the researchers

to become fully immersed in the day to day functioning the community which they are living. To begin gaining perspective on the ways in which Palestinian women conduct their daily lives, I conducted participant observation throughout the entirety of the project. I contained most of my research to the city of Ramallah. However, I did interview one woman who lives in a close village called Aboud. This woman works in Ramallah and switches between living in Ramallah (where she and her husband have a small apartment) and living in their home in Aboud. I interviewed her because she specifically asked me to come and see her at her home in Aboud.

My connection with Ramallah through lineage and my previous visits due to my internship with the Institute for Palestine Studies the previous summer were essential for creating initial contact with possible interlocutors. The time I spent in Ramallah in the summer of 2018 was instrumental in the formation of this study. It was through my interactions and discussions with women that I solidified the idea to examine shame. As I am Palestinian-American and was raised to very much adhere to Palestinian traditions, my inquiry into this topic also spurred from my own life experiences. I began conducting participant observation by hanging out with family and friends, going to cafes, and attending various events and celebrations around Ramallah such as wedding functions and festivals. From the established connections I made, I ventured into more places in Ramallah, such as the homes of women in town. Through participant observation, I was able to observe how women act in public and pay particular attention to the ways shame comes up in their daily lives. This helped to address my inquiry of how and why shame ideologies have shifted, what are those shifts, and how does shame affect Palestinian women's daily lives.

## **Interviews**

My established connections in Ramallah aided in finding initial interlocutors for this study. I then used snowball sampling to find additional interlocutors. I conducted interviews in both structured and semi-structured formats. After establishing initial contact with potential interlocutors, I set up formal and informal interviews with women from each generational category (as explained below). I conducted interviews in places such as women's homes and cafes. Before beginning interviews, I obtained verbal consent from my interlocutors. I conducted interviews in both English and Arabic. For the interviews conducted in Arabic, I had an interpreter to help facilitate dialogue. I have included an interview sample questions on Appendix A. The questions that I asked my interlocutors helped to address all three of my overarching research questions. These questions were used as an initial guide when conducting interviews with interlocutors. I recorded the interviews and took handwritten notes. As I interviewed my interlocutors, I collected demographic data, such as age, household makeup, religion, educational levels, etc., to better analyze the answers I received throughout the interview process. All recorded and typed interviews and notes were stored in password-protected documents and folders on my personal laptop and backed up on a password-protected external hard drive.

## **Intergenerational Approach**

This research took an intergenerational approach. Through the examination of research conducted by anthropologists, sociologists, psychologists, and numerous other social scientists, I came to the conclusion that there was no set method for categorizing generations within studies. (Connor 1977; Crumbley 2008; Leis & Hollas 1995; Nsamenang & Lamb 2014; Schwartz 1975; Vasquez 2011; Ward 2008; Yan 2016; Yarris 2017). Each author I examined used

categorizations that made sense to the particularities of their research site and people. Katherine Newman (1996) states that generational identity can be seen as a “form of subculture, and society itself becomes a patchwork quilt of groups defined by the formative events that shaped their lives as young adults” (Newman 1996, 374). She goes on to define a generation as a group of people who lived through a time period together and developed a “shared culture around its iconic screen heroes, social movements, political figures, musical innovations, and cataclysmic events” (Newman 1996, 374).

With this in mind, I decided to separate each generation into one of three groups. The first is the youngest generation that encompasses Palestinian women who would consider themselves daughters and do not have children of their own. These women fall between the ages of 18 and 35. The second group is the middle generation that incorporates women who are considered mothers, but do not have grandchildren. These women fall between the ages of 36 and 64. Finally, the last generation are Palestinian women who are considered grandmothers, meaning that they have both daughters and granddaughters. However, I have included women who are considered grandmothers but only have sons/grandsons. I make this choice with the knowledge that Arab women play a significant role in the child rearing of their extended family and community. These women are 65 years or older and have significant influence on their female family members as they are seen as familial matriarchs.

I am using the generational markers I described loosely to categorize the women I talked to but I paid slightly more attention to age than familial relations. This had to do with both the limited timeframe I had to complete my fieldwork but also because some women did not live by their families, who often still live in their home villages. As I utilized these markers to categorize women, it was important to understand that many markers overlapped and that all categorizes are

flexible. For each groups of women (daughters, mothers, and grandmothers), I incorporated other social roles with which they identify, for example, their roles as aunts and cousins. This is to account for the women who do not or cannot have children. I have used an arbitrary age categorization system to flexibly identify the age groups I believe will correlate with each certain life marker. I used the age system very loosely and used my interlocutors' own opinions of their social standing to categorize them. As stated above, many women might not identify with the three titles (daughter, mother, and grandmother) I assigned them, but identify with other social markers such as being aunts and cousins. Therefore, the age groupings allowed for more flexibility and inclusion for classifying interlocutors. Within the parameters of my categorization system, I acknowledge that all women I talked to identify as a daughter. I interviewed a total of 32 women; 16 women were in the youngest age group (18-34), 8 women were in the middle group (35-64), and 7 women were in the oldest group (65+).

This approach allowed me to record a variety of life experiences and thus lends itself to a more holistic depiction of shame ideologies in these women's lives. As well, it allowed me to compare the responses between women of the same generations while cross-examining their responses with the responses of women in the other generational categories. Separating interlocutors by generation helped to address my research questions regarding why and how shame ideologies have shifted in Palestinian society. It was also essential in helping to bring to light the reasoning behind ideological enforcement and particularly get at who enforces shame ideology.

Through both professional and personal outlets, I was able to connect with individuals in the youngest age group (daughters) while making initial contact. Making initial contact with women from the youngest generational group was done for multiple reasons. The first has to do

with my being a woman in her twenties and the likelihood of not obtaining automatic accessibility and trust from women in the two higher age categories. Due to my age and lack of status in the community, I assumed that women from the youngest age group would engage more readily than their older counterparts. By connecting with interlocutors from the younger generation, the research then used snowball sampling methodology to find participants within the other two generational groups. Women in the younger generation were helpful in fostering connections to women in the higher age categories, in some cases their own mothers and grandmothers, allowing me to compare familial beliefs. Using the youngest generation to connect with the two older generations facilitated a more trusting relationship between myself and the two older generations.

This research took place within a 2-month period. There were many benefits and drawbacks of conducting ethnographic research within this timeframe. A benefit was that I could focus strictly on my research questions and streamline my time spent with interlocutors. A drawback to conducting research in a short amount of time is that I was not be able to build a deep rapport with all of my interlocutors. Additionally, as a Palestinian woman, conducting research in Palestine is sometimes logistically difficult. Just as Palestinians living in the West Bank, I am susceptible to Israeli interrogation and restrictions. Although I am an American citizen, when I am in Palestine only my ethnicity matters. I know from both personal experience and stories from members of my community that Israel puts harsher restrictions and obstacles for Palestinians (both from the diaspora and those living in Palestine) traveling into the country than other groups. I was fortunate that I did not experience any obstacles on my trip for this fieldwork. I assume this is because of my previous visit to Ramallah and the fact that I have family in the city who are able to help facilitate potential logistical barriers.



## **Data Analysis**

After transcribing the interviews, I began to analyze them by identifying and comparing large themes that emerged. I then coded the interviews for subjects such as gender, marriage, religion, and changes in *eib*. Specifically, I coded for three main themes that emerged during my fieldwork. These themes were gender, space and body, and generational changes. I used these three larger themes as my main points of inquiry and then further broke them down from there. I then compiled excerpts of interviews I found to match the subjects I listed earlier and created lists in a word document that grouped them together. As I wrote this thesis, I pulled excerpts from the list to include to support my explanation. I did not use any specialized software during my analysis process.

## **Ethnographies of the Particular**

Palestinian women who reside in the West Bank, specifically those living within the parameters of Ramallah, are not in any way a homogeneous population. Although they all identify as Palestinian women, their lives and experiences are individualistic and varied. Often, the portrayal of Arab women becomes a repetitive rhetoric that depicts women in the Middle East as veiled, pious, and conservative. This representation has entered the public consciousness through both western media and academic writing. Western media's portrayal of Arab women stems from the violence that is rampant in the region, whereas academic writing is typically a response to the inaccurate depictions that are produced by western media. However, the academy's attempts to counter the negative stereotypes of western media still create a somewhat monolithic image of the "Muslim Arab Woman" (Abu-Lughod 2002). Although this work allowed for women to be portrayed in a more positive light, it was still a part of a larger framework that negated any individuality the researcher was striving to achieve. I acknowledge

that this demand to understand both the individual and the larger cultural context in which they exist is a challenging task.

One way to combat this dilemma is through what Abu-Lughod (1991) calls “ethnographies of the particular.” As Abu-Lughod explains the “ethnography of the particular” is a tool for “unsettling the culture concept and subverting the process of ‘othering’” (Abu-Lughod 1991, 473). Generalization in anthropology can lead to the discourse of objectivity and the claim of cultural expertise. This exposes the deeply flawed power differential that exists between the anthropologist and their interlocutors. The generalization of individuals’ lives can very quickly lead to the “othering” of certain groups of people. Abu-Lughod (1991) suggests that to avoid the pitfalls of generalization is to show the “actual circumstances and detailed histories of individuals and their relationships,” which in turn “would suggest that such particulars...are always crucial in constructing experiences” (Abu-Lughod 1991, 476). Just as we as individuals experience life in different ways than the people around us, so do the people whom we consider interlocutors. Her third, and final, point is that by reconstructing individuals’ own personal experiences and by examining their justifications and interpretations of what they and the people around them are doing, anthropologists can get a clearer picture of how social life proceeds.

Going into my research I determined I would try to implement as much of this ethos as I possibly could from the start. As I stated above, Palestinian women are not homogeneous. The women I talked to during my fieldwork were no exception to this reality. One way in which I attempted to combat the pitfalls of generalization was by asking all the women whom I talked to which town or village they and their families were from. Although this may seem like an unusual question to ask, in Palestine, the town or village which one’s ancestors have resided is a vital part of one’s identity. Each town or village in Palestine has its own unique history and customs.

Although Palestine was occupied by both the British and Ottoman empires before the current settler colonial occupation that began in 1948 and continues to this day, Palestinian politics have always taken place on a micro level. I also attempted to avoid generalizations by asking women about their occupations, their families, the number of siblings they have, and some more specifics about their lives. However, I must admit that due to the limitations and guidelines of this thesis's requirements, I do make broader claims about women's beliefs and participation in *eib* ideology on a societal level. As I stated earlier, I acknowledge that this demand to understand both the individual and the larger cultural context in which they exist is a challenging task.

## CHAPTER II

### GENDER AND *EIB*

Shame in Palestinian society is a deeply gendered phenomenon, with women as the most affected gender. Reema, a 38-year-old Muslim woman from Khalil (Hebron) told me that “*eib* is for a woman, related to women only.” In Palestine, women are the only members of society whose lives are dictated by shame ideologies. This seemed to be a fact that was common knowledge amongst both men and women. Although I did not officially interview men, I was able to deduce through conversations with men in Ramallah that they too believed that *eib* only affects women. These sentiments were usually vocalized through men beginning to list all of the activities which women participate in that are considered *eib* (shameful). While discussing my thesis topic, one man proceeded to list off what was considered *eib* in the style that I stated above. He went on for about a minute and a half saying, “if she does this, its *eib*; if she does this, its *eib*.” As he took a breath to continue his laundry list, one of the women I was with cut him off and said, “why is it only ‘she’, what about ‘he’?” He turned to her and laughed and said “oh, no, it’s never ‘he’.” All of the woman, regardless of their age, who shared their insight with me held that same viewpoint. I argue that not only does shame reinforce gender ideologies in Palestinian society, it is responsible for creating the very ideologies which it then maintains.

Two cousins, Samira (25-year-old, Khalil) and Muntaha (25-year-old, Khalil)<sup>3</sup>, whom I bring up again later in this chapter, perfectly encapsulate what *eib* is to women in Palestinian society compared to men.

**Samira:** I think effects side of *eib*, it's about being human. I think we have it [*eib*] more than the males, the females. But the things are more harder for the girls, how you act, what you wear. You can't be normal because you want to be accepted [by] the society. To be a good wife, to have a husband. So it's harder for us. But for him [men], its easy. He have the power to choose the girl he want, he has the power. It's easier for him because he can choose whatever girl he wants but for us, it's different<sup>4</sup>.

**Muntaha:** Sometimes the same stake [action], a girl does it and a boy does it and the girl's punishment will be bigger than the boy because he is a boy.

**Samira:** I think when a man, he does something wrong, *eib*, they just give him excuses, like it's just a fault [one-time occurrence or accident]. We can easily forget that fault [occurrence/accident], it's normal, humans doing something. But if a woman did that, no, it's not a fault [accident], it's a disaster and no one will forget that because, you know, it's not fair. It's like we are not human, that we can't do anything wrong. Like you [must be] perfect.

The sociologist Norbert Elias, in his article "Shame and Repugnance," theorizes that shame is a phenomenon that occurs because of the fear of peoples' assertions of superiority (Elias 1989, 414). In Elias's opinion, shame is a "form of displeasure or fear which arises characteristically on those occasions when a person who fears lapsing into inferiority can avert this danger neither by direct physical means nor by any other form of attack" (Elias 1989, 414). Shame is merged with a sense of anxiety that materializes from the fact that the person feels as though they have done something or will do something that contradicts the norm of the people to whom they are bound (Elias 1989, 414). "Shame is about appearance, about how the subject

---

<sup>3</sup> Every woman mentioned in this thesis was given a pseudonym to protect her identity. I did indicate their true age and the actual village they are from because they are important indicators of their identity and help to fully understand their perspective.

<sup>4</sup> I chose to keep the excerpts from my interviews as close to the actual interview as possible. I clarified points that were not clear through brackets. I chose to keep these excerpts as is because I did not want to lose the individuality and voice of these women.

appears before and to others” (Lampert 2008, 43), leading to the internalization of behaviors that elevate consequences resulting in shameful acts. In other words, shame can be classified as the failure to act according to social values and the inevitable consequence of being publicly disgraced (Stewart 2015). Shame for Palestinian women, like Elias outlines, occurs not just for things that have happened but for things that haven’t happened or will never happen at all. *Eib* ideology is used as a tool to prevent shaming for potential actions.

Shame in Arab culture is often referred to by the Arabic word “*eib/ayb*,” which can also be used to show respect, honorable modesty, subdued femininity, and “deference to one’s elders and social superiors” (Ilahiane 2019, 57). However, the network of values that are traditionally associated with honor are generally connected with masculinity (Abu-Lughod 1986; Dubisch 1993; Stewart 2015). Honor is also associated with autonomy, meaning that autonomy within Arab culture is strictly masculine (Abu-Lughod 1986). Honor is a system that is based on hierarchy where individuals who hold more power, or autonomy, reap the benefits of the system, i.e. men (Abu-Lughod 1986; Baxter 2007; Stewart 2015).

As I began to meet with women during my fieldwork, I quickly noticed commonalities as to how women both defined and thought about *eib*, regardless of their age and background. With each interview I conducted, the first question I asked was how each woman would define and describe *eib*. *Eib*, according to the women I spoke to, can be defined as anything that the society (Palestinian society) deems as wrong or against societal norms. A woman named Muna, who is a 52-year-old Christian from Ramallah, stated that “*Eib*, anything that should be shameful, is something that would not go within the norms, traditions, and customs of a society.” The idea that shame is something that goes against social norms was a sentiment brought up by every woman I spoke to.

One woman, Hanan, who is in her late 40's and is a Christian from Bethlehem, stated that “*Eib* is the thing you don't want to do in front of all the people. If it's something you can do in front of the people, then it's not *eib*. If you can't do it in front of all the people, then it's *eib*.” This theme of being able to “do something” in front of people came up a lot in conversation. In particular, the notion of right or wrong was a theme that almost every woman brought up. Many scholars have identified shame in the Middle East as an emotion that is related to one's sense of self (Glick et.al. 2016; Rasmussen 2007). Shame is represented through the collective social order, as well as through individuals' emotional sentiment (Rasmussen 2007, 235). Muna also explained that if one does not abide by social norms and makes decisions that are considered individualistic, or against the social order, then their actions are considered shameful and not acceptable.

However, shame is also contingent upon members of the community becoming aware that an act was committed that veered from the social norms. The presence of shame results in a Foucauldian sense of self-monitoring, which places individuals under persistent vigilance (Rashidian et.al 2013, 868). The high constraint that is put on members of a society forces individuals to become their own self monitors and subscribe to the “submissive effects” of the hegemonic culture (Rashidian et.al 2013, 868). This point was articulated by a woman named Abeer, a 22-year-old whose grandparents come from variety of backgrounds but until 1948 resided in Ramla before coming as refugees to Ramallah. Abeer spoke about the ways which people follow societal practices. As we sat in a sunny yellow café off of one of the main roads in Ramallah, Abeer's initial nerves of being interviewed subdued and she launched into insightful perspectives regarding shame ideologies. We were discussing her personal views of shame/*eib* and she mentioned that she thinks there are people who intentionally and unintentionally follow

the social rule. I found that phrasing particularly interesting and pressed further to understand what she meant. She said:

So, I think these people are not the same as people who intentionally do it. But I also think.. I don't know if you heard of the metaphor before – oppression is like a conveyer belt or like standing on the conveyer belt – so like passive or active, yeah and so you're just standing on the conveyer belt and letting it just take you, you are still a part of the system. And then if you are walking with it, you're furthering the system. So what you have to do to go against the system is to walk against the conveyer belt. Like, if you don't speak up against injustice, you're kind of being part of it.

She uses the example of the conveyer belt to demonstrate the conscious and unconscious ways in which women participate in the perpetuation of shame ideologies. Even being passive and unconsciously adhering to societal norms marks you as a participant. The participation that Abeer describes also explains the Foucauldian modes of self-monitoring which shame creates. Although it may not be a consistent conscious effort, women's decisions are guided by shame ideologies that have been conditioned into their psyche from the time they were born. To refer back to Abeer's analogy, although they may not be moving with the conveyer belt, they are still standing on it. Women often frame their self-monitoring in terms of knowing and doing what they believe is "right" or "wrong." By framing it in these terms, women make their participation in this system more palatable for both themselves and the women they have influence over.

Within her article "Seductions of the 'Honor Crime'," Abu-Lughod (2011) poses a question that gets at the heart of what this research hopes to achieve. She asks, "Is there a way to think about the restrictions on women's behavior other than as constraints imposed by men on their freedom?" (Abu-Lughod 2011, 21). Women's participation in the moral systems of the Middle East is almost always explained as a product of men's coercion. However, as Abu-Lughod points out, and I fervently agree, this argument is very problematic and heralds from western feminist thought that portrays Arab women as individuals who do not have autonomy



over their lives. This portrayal neglects to understand the social systems, such as gendered structures, hierarchy, and communal relations, that affect people of color, especially Arabs.

With this in mind, I believe the short answer to Abu-Lughod's question is yes. Patriarchy is not the simplistic idea that men have total unwavering control over women. This definition assumes a monolithic framework to a system of patriarchy and the category of "men" as a gender. It also completely negates women of any agency, self-determination, or participation in society. I like to use a metaphor of a clock to frame the way that patriarchy works in the case of shame ideology. Imagine the face of a clock; it's simple, shiny, and it tells you the time. Now picture the inside of the clock: it's full of cogs and complex parts that allow the clock to work. It's not as simple, or straightforward, but it is essential for the clock face to tell the time. In this metaphor, imagine patriarchy as the shiny clock face. It is easy to point out that Palestinians live in a patriarchal society and, although I am by no means arguing that Palestinian society isn't patriarchal, it must be acknowledged that claiming a society is patriarchal should not be the end of one's exploration to women's place in that society. Patriarchy is not the only explanation for shame ideologies and gendered norms. If one looks at the cogs in the metaphor, one realizes the basic function of the clock is dependent entirely on the functioning of its inner parts. I argue the women in society are equivalent to the cogs because without women's cooperation and full participation, patriarchy would not work. This can be thought of in terms of "patriarchal bargaining," which encompasses the powerful influences which shapes "women's gendered subjectivity" and determines "the nature of gender ideology in different contexts" (Kandiyoti 1988, 275). I found that women were full participants in the perpetuation of *eib/* shame ideologies not because they were being coerced by men to act a certain way, but because they on their own volition perpetuate these ideologies. I found that the maintenance of shame ideologies

was a direct result of women's belief in the system and women's influence over other women in their lives.

Saba Mahmood, for example, explains that women's lives should be explored outside of the traditional western feminist notion that agency is the crossroads of the political and moral autonomy of an individual in the face of power. She explains, "We must not think of agency as a synonym for resistance to relations of domination, but as a capacity for action that specific relations of subordination enable and create" (Mahmood 2001, 203). As Mahmood states, it is important to not categorize women as being brainwashed by men into easy submission to traditional patriarchal ideals. Women's lives are not, and should not, be simply examined through the binary of resistance or subordination. This does not give sufficient attention to "motivations, desires, and goals that [are] not necessarily captured by these terms" (Mahmood 2001, 209).

One of the most important components of shame ideology that became immediately clear as more women spoke to me is the fact that this is a system of beliefs that is directly disseminated and reinforced by women to other women. The women I spoke with expressed that it is their mothers who were responsible for their understanding of *eib*. However, as Palestinians function in a communal society, other women such as aunts, grandmothers, and close female family friends also play a large role in enforcing and teaching about *eib*. This does not necessarily exclude the men present in a woman's life from also helping to enforce *eib* ideologies; however, I found that it was often women who took a more active role in ensuring its maintenance. Zahwa, a 50-year-old Christian, explained this to me as we sat on her front terrace at her home in a small village named Aboud, which is near Ramallah.

As any person, there are different people or issues that affects the little ones. First of all, like in Arab communities, it's a long [large] family. So, everybody interferes in raising the person...everybody tells you that it's *eib*. When you go to school, the same thing. You find some teachers, even your colleagues, they bring their own *eib*. Because sometimes you will sit a certain way and they say 'no, no, no my mother says don't sit like this' because you're a girl.

Another woman named Muntaha, who is a 25-year-old Muslim woman from Khalil (Hebron) had sentiments that were very similar to Zahwa's. I interviewed Muntaha in an apartment belonging to my father's cousin that could not have been more than 200 sq ft. and was filled with about 10 women in total including myself. As one can imagine, in a space that small, voices can carry but fortunately every time Muntaha spoke everyone quieted down. Along with Muntaha, I was also interviewing her mother, aunt, and cousin. When I asked her, who taught her what *eib* is, she responded by saying:

It starts with the family, maybe school because our teachers like the age of our moms. So, we used to do anything in the school they know it's *eib*. You are a girl, you can't do that, you can't do this. Like the places we used to go, school, family. Family not just our parents, my aunts, the whole family, your neighbors. Like if they have the chance to say it, they say it...But when we were younger I think people think they have that effect on us. So when they treat you from your age, like 5, 6, they start, like shaping you; this is *eib*, this is not. So when we get older, I think they just give up. But some people still [tell them *eib*], but not like when we were younger.

When I asked other woman that same question, many would answer with the simple answer of "my mother." As well, I asked women who could say *eib* to them and the answer varied depending on the women's age. For younger and middle-aged women, it was anyone who is older than them, yet they tended to indicate that only people in their immediate family could say it to them. On the other hand, it was indicated that no one could tell an older woman *eib* because of her status in the family and community. I came to a realization when I was talking to Farha, a 74-year-old woman from Ramallah, about who is allowed to say *eib* to certain people. We were sitting on her apartments balcony that overlooked a busy street. She sat directly next to me and I

was turned so I could look at her while we spoke. Farha was about the twentieth woman I interviewed during my fieldwork, so I had already heard the opinions from a variety of women. As we were discussing who can say *eib* to her and in the past, who was allowed to tell her *eib*, she indicated what every older woman had indicated already, that no one in the present can tell her *eib* because of her age and status in the community. She went on to say that when she was younger only people in her family could tell her *eib*. I looked up at her asked her who she could say *eib* to. She said that she could only tell her family members (and very close family friends) *eib* because it was inappropriate for her to tell people outside of the family *eib*. This is the point where I took pause. Her statement about only being able to say *eib* to family members and not neighbors was one that resonated throughout every interview I already conducted. I then said “Wait... people can’t say *eib* to their neighbors or anyone outside of the family, but everyone cares what everyone else thinks, even though, technically, no one can say anything to you?” She turned to me with a half shocked, half amused face, laughed and said “Well, yes, I guess so...I never realized that.” This statement indicates that although there is a precedent as to who is allowed to tell a woman *eib*, women are in a constant fear of what people think about them and if they consider their actions *eib*. This leads to women vigilantly self-monitoring their behaviors.

It is imperative to recognize that force is not necessarily the only means of self-monitoring, especially in regard to Arab women’s realities, and that agency plays a role in this paradigm. Mahmood (2001) examines the notion of agency through actions. She states that “action does not issue forth from natural feelings but *creates* them” (Mahmood 2001, 214). In other words, the practices and actions one engages in determine individual desires and emotions (Mahmood 2001, 214). Many scholars within the Mediterranean and Middle East believe that honor/shame is comprised of both an individual’s sense of self-worth and their reputation in the

surrounding community (Stewart 2015). Bourdieu (1966) explains that the basis of the honor/shame dynamic is an individual centering their moral code through other people's perceptions of them so that their image of themselves is "indistinguishable from that presented to [them] by other people" (Bourdieu 1966, 211). I found that women felt that their perceptions of themselves and the way their community perceived them had to align in order for them to not feel shame. The common sentiment that I heard was that they themselves do not do anything that is *eib*, so therefore they do not have to worry about it. However, I would argue that there is not a conscious acknowledgement that they actively avoid certain behaviors to spare themselves from communal judgement. In this sense, *eib* can be described as a form of habitus.

Originally theorized by Pierre Bourdieu (1977), habitus is the "durably installed generative principle of regulated improvisations" (Bourdieu 1977, 78). To expand on this definition, Bourdieu states:

The structures of a particular type of environment (e.g. the material conditions of existence characteristic of a class condition) produce habitus, systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, a principles of the generation and structuring of practices and representations which can be objectively 'regulated' and 'regular' without in any way being the product of obedience to rules, objectively adapted to their goals without presupposing and conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery of the operations necessary to attain them and being all this collectively orchestrated without being the product of the orchestrating action of a conductor. (Bourdieu 1977, 78).

*Eib* is a form of habitus in the lives of Palestinian women. Women follow *eib* ideology both consciously and unconsciously. As well, *eib* is rarely every explicitly discussed among women in society but all women know that it is a system which they are required to follow to ensure the proper functioning of society.

Connecting Mahmood's point of examining the notion of agency through action to the concept of habitus can help produce a theory about the perpetuation and existence of shame

ideologies in women's lives. Within her writing, Mahmood states that, "habitus... refers to a conscious effort of reorienting desires, brought about by the concordance of inward motives, outward actions, inclinations, and emotional states through the repeated practice of virtuous deeds" (Mahmood 2001, 215). To put it in simpler terms, one's actions are dictated through the culmination of societal and individual beliefs and practices to produce actions and thoughts. With the theoretical framework of habitus in mind, Mahmood goes on to reevaluate Judith Butler's (1988) conceptualization of the model of performance. Butler explains that gender and identity are instituted through the stylized repetition of acts (Butler 1988, 519). Through her reexamination, Mahmood states that "the model of performance... emphasizes the sedimented and cumulative character of reiterated performances, where each performance builds on prior ones, and a carefully calibrated system exists by which differences between reiterations are judged in terms of how successfully (or not) the performance has taken root in the body and mind" (Mahmood 2001, 216). Shame, positioned within the framework of habitus, can be seen as a component of one's embodied performance. Shame is not an emotion or action that is coerced or imposed by those in power; it is the individual holding themselves accountable for their actions within their reality, making self-monitoring a more pervasive practice.

This means that the ideology surrounding shame does not flow through patriarchal channels where it is then dispersed to women. On the contrary, it is through women's actions and direct interaction with other women that the ideologies surrounding shame are reinforced. Women become their own self-monitors in a belief system that is rooted in the good standing of men. When asked how shame impacts her life, Abeer gave me this anecdote: "I think the way it would is whenever you're doing stuff, you're thinking whether it would be considered *eib* here or how it would affect you and that whole thing of what you do doesn't just affect you, it affects

your family and everybody. And it's not like you think about it all the time, but it's like simple stuff." Essentially, the point Abeer is conveying is that *eib* is both an unconscious and conscious phenomenon, making it a form of habitus.

Connecting back to my main thesis questions, *eib* is a phenomenon that centers around the breaking of social functioning, traditions, norms. It is the foundation for gendered thinking in Palestinian society, specifically it is the gendered indoctrination to womanhood for all Palestinian women. It is a form of habitus in the lives of Palestinian women and is enforced and passed on from older women (specifically a woman's mother) to younger women. *Eib* ideology is also maintained through diligent self-monitoring. However, *eib* is a phenomenon that occurs on a conscious and unconscious level. In the section above I have showcased the ways which women in Ramallah think about shame and how they would define it. I also explored how shame manifests in the lives of Palestinian women and how it is enforced. Next, I will examine how religion is affected by *eib* ideology.

### **Religion and Eib**

I have approached my research outside of a religious framework for a variety of reasons. First, Ramallah is a religiously diverse city that is the home to both Muslim and Christian Palestinians. I felt that the exclusion of one religious group would be counterproductive to my attempt to understand Palestinian women as a whole. My second reason for including both religious groups has to do with the nature of *eib*. As explained in the first part of this chapter, *eib* is a phenomenon that is linked directly to social functioning, beliefs, and traditions. *Eib* impacts every aspect of Palestinian culture, and as religion is only a fraction of a society's cultural makeup, it would be irresponsible to concentrate my analysis solely on shame through the lens of religion. Previous research that centers the honor/shame dichotomy or focuses on Palestinian

women often does so within the lens of religion, particularly Islam. Previous research often frames moral systems within Arab communities as a product of religious institutions. This is in part because “this association of the subfield [Middle Eastern anthropology] with the combination of Islam and Gender is undoubtedly related to greater public interest in the status of women in the region and the use of women’s liberation as justification for U.S. military misadventures in Muslim-majority societies” (Deeb and Winegar 2012, 544). It is within the spirit to further deviate from this narrative that I structured my research.

During fieldwork, I made it a point to not ask specific questions about religion to my interlocutors, but I did not steer them away from religion when they brought it up. When religion was brought up regarding *eib*, the women I interviewed made it emphatically clear that *eib* has nothing to do with religion. This statement usually came up while discussing what *eib* is and how it affects their lives and the lives of the women around them. For instance, three interviewees, all Muslim women, articulated their explanation of *eib* as separate from religion. The first woman Samira, whom I mentioned in my first chapter, stated that “the religion [Islam] says it’s [going against religious beliefs] *haram* (forbidden in Islam), it’s different from *eib*. *Eib* is only about the people. It’s different because *haram* is from God but *eib* is from the people. It’s only traditions so why do I have to commit to traditions from people [from the past] because the life is changing so fast.” I found this to be an interesting point and asked her to elaborate some more. Her cousin Muntaha, who was sitting with us at the time, added quickly that “people care more about what other people think than what God thinks.” What she was implying with this statement is that people who identify as Muslim are more motivated to follow *eib* than they are to follow Islamic beliefs of *haram*. Along the same lines as Samira, a woman named Noura who is 21 years and from Khalil (Hebron), stated that “in our society, people believe in shame more than *haram*”



Although I am only showcasing these three examples, almost all of the women whom I talked to made statements that reflected this line of thinking, regardless if they were Muslim or Christian. All three women did say that older generations (i.e. their parents and grandparents) are attempting to merge *eib* and haram together to persuade their children to be more pious. This was viewed as a tactic used by older generations as an attempt to persuade younger women to veil.

### **Marriage and Sexuality**

The one aspect of Palestinian women's lives in which *eib* is affected by religious beliefs is marriage. Marriage is not impacted by either religion's specific doctrine, but more simply by the religion that one follows. It is considered *eib* by both Muslim and Christian Palestinians to participate in an inter-religious marriage. It is expected that one's partner shares the same religious beliefs that they and their family hold. This restriction was explained to be in place for multiple reasons. The first is due to the intense prejudice that exists amongst Muslim and Christian Palestinians for one another's religion. It is not necessarily a prejudice that limits social interaction or deep friendships, but one that stems from each party believing their individual religious beliefs are "correct," whereas the other party's is not. The sentiments that were often expressed to me regarding interreligious marriages was that either side would feel that their loved one, if they converted, would be betraying the "true" religion and ultimately dooming their afterlife. The second, and more logistical, reasoning behind the lack of interreligious marriages is due to the court system. In Palestine, there is not a civil court for marriage. If one wants to get married, they must get married either in the Christian court or the Islamic court. Therefore, if two individuals from different religious backgrounds wanted to get married, one would have to convert, otherwise their marriage can't take place.

It was unanimously expressed that marriage is something that all individuals wanted for themselves and for their daughters. Marriage is an important life phase for young women in Palestine because an unmarried woman is seen as a burden and shame to her family. Women are expected to live with their families until they wed. I found that marriage was the barometer for when a young woman could be considered an adult. Until the point of marriage, women are not treated as equals to their peers who are already married. There was an unspoken belief that the normative life stages of a woman could be identified as girlhood, marriage/raising children, and old age.

Marriage is an important institution to examine when discussing shame for Arab women because a woman's "honor" is often measured from her lack pre-marital sexual encounters (Adely 2012; Harik and Marston 1996). Abu-Lughod explains that "women are more closely associated with sexuality through their reproductive capacities [therefore] they represent not the embodiment of the social order, as do the mature men at the top of the hierarchy, but its antithesis. And because 'honor' is attained through embodying the cultural ideals, in this sphere, too, women are morally inferior" (Abu-Lughod 1986, 130). Shame is used as a tool to ensure that young girls maintain the social order regarding marriage and sex. There was a consistent consensus among my collaborators that that one of the most *reib* (or shameful) acts a woman could participate in was that of pre-marital sex. It is widely considered that familial "honor" is rooted in the virtue of women and it is the responsibility of the family, as well as the community, to closely monitor any behavior that would go against those ideals (Harik and Marston 1996). Traditional conservative families will attempt to marry their daughters off as quickly as possible because they believe that if the woman is younger, than she will adapt to her husband's family

faster (Harik and Marston 1996, 70). As well, if a young girl is married as soon as possible, the likelihood of her engaging in shameful acts, such as premarital relationships, decreases.

However, the idea that woman should be married early is being negotiated for a few reasons. The fact that most young woman are expected to attend both primary school and some form of university has made the expected age of marriage later. Compared to the two older generations, women in my youngest generation group were not expected to marry until they reached their twenties; however, the point in her twenties that was deemed acceptable for a woman to marry is completely dependent on her family's opinion. The age which women are expected to marry varies across generations. As I stated, now women typically marry in their twenties, however, in earlier generations, young girls would be married around the age of fourteen. Some of the women I spoke to were married in this way and they fervently expressed how they did not want that same fate for their daughters.

Yasmine (51-year-old, Bethlehem, Muslim), for example, told me a story of her grandmother. She said that one day, when her grandmother was 14, she heard music outside of her house. She was curious so she wandered outside to ask where the music was coming from. She was quickly informed that the music was for her engagement. She had no idea that she was engaged until that moment. Yasmine explained that for her grandmother's generation, it was *eib* to see your husband before the wedding happened, meaning that young girls had no idea what the man they were to marry looked like. Juliette (50 year-old, Ramallah, Christian) explained how marriage operated in previous generations and how it happens now.

In the old times, they make to marry the girls at a very young age, like 12. They marry the girl and they don't ask her. She didn't see the guy till the wedding day. Maybe just at the church. This happens in Ramallah in the old days. Once, the guy asks for the girl, saying we want this one. She says no and runs away. She didn't know the guy; she didn't want to marry him. But her family forced her to marry this guy. But now no, because all

of the girls go to university, they go to work, they know each other, they have a special relation between... not for sex, no sex before marry – that is very big *eib!*... and they know him and they marry between each other, love, they live each other.

Education, which I will address in more depth in later chapters, has become an expectation to secure a successful marriage. Adely (2012) states that, in Jordan, young women become desirable and respectable marriage partners through their continued education. This change in expectations before marriage has in turn pushed back the age which young women are expected to marry. However, as Adely points out, there are different opportunities available to young women depending on “socioeconomic status and their parents’ education and professional status as with gendered expectations” (Adely 2012, 42). If a young woman has the socioeconomic means and grades to go to university, then it is expected that she marries after she graduates. However, sometimes women will marry while still in university and the decision for them to continue their education falls on their husband. If a girl does not have the means to go to university, then her family hopes she marries quickly, or she will most likely not marry. If she can not secure a good marriage, then it is very unlikely she will secure skilled employment that pays a decent wage.

Even after a woman is married, discussing sex or sexuality, or displaying affection towards one’s partner in public is considered *eib*. These components of *eib* ideology have not changed much across generations. Hanan (50-year-old, Bethlehem, Christian) explained that she could not show affection to her husband in public. She said it was unacceptable for married couples to kiss or hug in public. Even though they are married, public displays of affection are considered shameful because sex, according to society, is only for reproductive purposes (Abu-Lughod 1986). Women are told that they should not be interested in sex outside of procreation. Farah (74-year-old, Ramallah, Christian) told me a story from the early years of her marriage.

She told me that in the 1970's her husband went to the United States and left her alone with their kids. After he left, she cried a lot and her mother-in-law told her it was *eib* to cry because people will think that she's crying because her husband left, and she needed sex. In reality, she was crying because she was alone for an unforeseeable amount of time and had to raise her children on her own while maintaining financial stability.

### Conclusion

Shame in Palestinian society is a deeply gendered phenomenon, with women as the most affected gender. Shame is often expressed through the Arabic word of *Eib* and indicates a form of “respect, honorable modesty, subdued femininity, and “deference to one’s elders and social superiors” (Ilahiane 2019, 57). This refers back to Muna’s point that “*eib*, anything that should be shameful, is something that would not go within the norms, traditions, and customs of a society.” In past research, shame was often framed through the lens of religion, particularly Islam. However, as indicated above, *eib* is associated with larger societal practices and not solely religion. *Eib* is taught to women starting from the time they are children and are often enforced and reinforced by the women in their families, particularly their mothers. *Eib* ideology is a system that women perpetuate to ensure that their daughters become respectable members of their communities.

As women get older, they begin to self-monitor their own behaviors and thoughts to embody *eib* ideology in their daily lives. *Eib* is a form of habitus in the lives of Palestinian women. Women follow *eib* ideology both consciously and unconsciously. As well, *eib* is rarely ever explicitly discussed among women in society (because it is *eib* to discuss *eib*), but all women know that it is a system which they are required to follow to ensure the proper functioning of society. Shame, positioned within the framework of habitus, can be seen as a component of one’s embodied

performance. Shame is not an emotion or action that is coerced or imposed by those in power; it is the individual holding themselves accountable for their actions within their reality, making self-monitoring a more pervasive practice.

## CHAPTER III

### SPACE, PLACE, AND BODY

One aspect of shame ideology in the Middle East that is not often discussed is the way that shame dictates and affects spatial relations. This is particularly true when examining space through the perspective of Palestinian women. *Eib* ideology does not only affect the mental and emotional state of being for Palestinian women but impacts the ways they interact with the physical world around them. With this chapter, I will take the opportunity to explore the connection between space and *eib*. I will first explain how space is a product of social creation and therefore can have meaning ascribed to it. I will then explore how the Israeli apartheid has shifted and changed the ways in which Palestinian women interact with space. Next I will show the ways which *eib* ideology is essential to the establishment of both the domestic and public spheres. Finally, I will discuss how through *eib* ideology, women's bodies can be viewed as space to which meaning is ascribed. With this chapter, I will defer to my larger thesis questions of how *eib* ideology manifests in Palestinian women's lives and, to some extent, the ways in which it is enforced.

#### **Space and Place**

Henri Lefebvre's (1991) definition of space centers around the idea that space is a social production. Specifically, he states that "social space is a social production... space thus produced also serves as a tool of thought and of action...in addition to being a means of production it is also a means of control, and hence of domination, of power" (Lefebvre 1991, 26). Essentially,

Lefebvre advocates that space be thought of as a mode of production. However, as geographical studies on space advanced, researchers such as Doreen Massey (2005) began to reimagine the concept of space with a different approach. Massey encourages space to be thought of a continuous entity, meaning that it is never stagnant. Massey pulls reasoning from Foucault who says that in the past, space was treated as a fixed entity, something that does not move. However, space should be thought about as a phenomenon that is constantly shifting and moving. Massey and Duncan & Duncan (1988) argue that space is essentially a text which is experienced through the active production of social relations. Space can be interpreted as a “product of social contexts of historically and culturally specific discourses; [space is] constructed by interpreting communities and they frequently, but not always, reflect hegemonic value systems” (Duncan & Duncan 1988, 120). When looking at landscapes of space, it can be said that they hold an important role in creating ideology, or supporting a set of ideas and values, within the social process (Duncan & Duncan 1988). Furthermore, the interpretation of a particular landscape is a political process that has material consequences.

Duncan & Duncan state that “if landscapes are texts which are read, interpreted according to an ingrained cultural framework of interpretation, if they are often read ‘inattentively’ at a particular or nondiscursive level, then they may be inculcating their readers with a set of notions about how the society is organized” (Duncan & Duncan 1988, 123). Thinking about the production and interpretation of landscape and space as a political process in the framework of the Israeli occupation raises questions of hegemonic values and whose text is worthy of being read. Within the last ninety years of occupation within the Palestinian territories, space as a tool to enforce political restrictions has become an obvious reality. Space is the central point of the entire conflict; therefore, the regulation on space by Israeli forces has proven to be a way of



restraining Palestinian people. Restrictions of space through the creation of checkpoints, walls, and armed force have led to the governing of both Palestinian space and Palestinians' navigation within said space. Palestinian people are restricted in every aspect of their lives. They cannot move within their designated space without being forced to check in with the hegemonic power structure of the Israeli government and army. Space, in this sense, is a means of securing a singular political ideology.

To bring together feminist geographers' thought on the connection between space and the women who reside in it, I will delve into McDowell's (1999) analysis on the subject. McDowell discusses the relation between gender and the nation-state and how feminist scholars have unpacked the realities of those two entities. She states that "the relationship between 'race' or ethnicity and gender become particularly significant... as nations are usually defined in terms of the links between a particular space or territory and its peoples to the exclusion of 'others'" (McDowell 1999, 170). The state has power over the gendered relations of the individuals living within its bounds. McDowell looks at different aspects of the gender / nation-state dichotomy to help support her argument, particularly she examines past feminist literature on the subject. The first aspect "revolves around the relationship between the state and civil society and the actions of the state as a judge between citizens in its distributional and coercive policies" (McDowell 1999, 171). McDowell then explores the gender / nation/state dichotomy concerns women and the "welfare state." This pertains to health services women receive from the state and how the state is a key player in commodifying and regulating women's bodies: "Through these welfare institutions and through the legal system, therefore, 'private' issues of sexuality, childbirth, and the management of health are regulated and controlled" (McDowell 1999, 171). She then analyzes the dichotomy of gender and the state through the approach of critical feminist cultural

and literary studies, which looks at images, symbols, and representation of the nation in text, pictures, and iconography within the built environment (McDowell 1999, 171).

With the understanding of the larger political context of spatial realities in the apartheid, one can begin to unpack how both Arab cultural structures and Israeli military occupation merge to create particular realities for Palestinian women. Women in the Middle East, as a whole, are often portrayed as helpless individuals who only follow the orders of the men in their lives. However, this very generalized portrayal of Arab women completely ignores the autonomy women hold over their participation and negotiation of cultural norms. This negotiation takes place on both a micro and macro level, where women within Palestinian society are susceptible to ideologies that govern the space they are allowed to occupy. Palestinian women must navigate within a patriarchal societal structure that dictates what space they can occupy, as well as negotiate their position within the larger Israeli political hegemony.

We first must call upon work from feminist geographers to understand how patriarchal structures affect spatial relations. Peake (1993) states that the patriarchal structure (patriarchy built into the physical landscape) within urban, and I argue rural, spaces has been largely unaccounted for within research. By looking at patriarchal structuring, Peake is able to unpack how it affects gender, race, class, and sexuality. Her first argument encompasses a feminist critique that states that the city, and in particular the physical city space, is shaped to confine women to traditional roles. By traditional roles, she means that women are firmly planted within the domestic sphere, which makes access to “the city” only possible through patriarchal social relations such as marriage and the family. The second point is that that women’s responsibility for domestic labor circumscribes their mobility within space (Peake 1993, 147). Women’s mobility within the city is limited because the patriarchal structures that keep them in the

domestic sphere also ensure that the domestic sphere is specifically located. By specifically located, I mean that the domestic sphere exists only within the home and its existence in this space cannot be negotiated or moved.

In Palestine, there is a distinct difference between the way that shame ideology is enforced in cities as opposed to villages. Many of the women I talked to were originally from smaller villages and there was a consensus that shame in villages is more stringent than shame in Ramallah. In particular, women's access to space in rural areas is more controlled than in cities. Below is a vignette by a 38-year-old woman named Reema from Hebron: (Translated by interpreter)

She's from Hebron. For villagers and for Muslims, it's not appropriate that a man enter the house and sees the women inside. There should be a man there. So, she said that there are people that came for the hot water to the parents, and her son didn't let them in the house because his sisters are there. His mom is not there, and his father is not there. So, he's young but he knows its *eib* to let anyone come inside the house. And she was telling me about a story she heard today from her sister in Hebron. A boy used to bring his friends home and they used to stay late. So, they saw his sister and they came once when nobody was home in the evening and they took the girl. She's disabled and they took her and raped her. So she's [Reema] afraid about her daughters and she wants to tell them the story, to tell her husband, to tell everybody, so they take care of this thing. In consideration to not let anyone into the house and she wants to separate her house so anyone who enters into the salon or the living room, he doesn't see her daughters.

Reema's story from her sister is an example of how shame ideology, and stories of consequences when shame ideologies are ignored, impact the spaces that women can occupy even within the domestic realm. The threat of violence is a motivation to reinforce shame ideologies and to renegotiate which spaces are deemed acceptable for women to occupy.

Although Khalil (Hebron) has a larger land mass than Ramallah, it still exists in the framework that isolates women in the home. The women who moved to Ramallah from smaller villages expressed their concerns with the "urban" ideology that exists in Ramallah. Ramallah is called an

“open city” by people all over Palestine. I gathered that the label of an “open city” exists because Ramallah is a town where many people resettled after their villages were destroyed or raided by Israeli forces. People consider Ramallah a place where any Palestinian can go and feel welcome. However, in terms of shame ideology’s relation to space, Ramallah poses new challenges to already established boundaries. While talking to Zahwa, she elaborated on this point by also explaining that certain regions of the country bring certain ideological beliefs on shame. She stated that, although there has been a lot of change in Ramallah, both the northern and southern parts of Palestine have not advanced as much. For instance, in the northern and southern villages, girls are still forced to marry at 14 years old. She indicated that Palestinians in these regions do not change their ideologies until they leave their home village. She indicates that the shift in shame ideology is connected to social progress, which many villages have not experience in the same ways that Ramallah has.

Due to the high volume of individuals, especially women, moving their families to Ramallah, people have become more protective of their female relatives because of the unfamiliarity of the surroundings and people. Space is used as a way to protect women and the way society gets women to abide by spatial restrictions is through shame. Jamileh [30 years old from Khalil (Hebron)] stated that when she was a child, her family used to live in a small village in Jordan for a period, where they had their own house. The privacy of the house allowed for her to play outside whenever she wanted, as it was deemed safe because they had no neighbors. However, her family decided to move to Ramallah and that sense of security and movement promptly ended. Ramallah is a larger city and the privacy that Jamileh’s family experienced in their house in Jordan vanished. When they moved to Ramallah they moved into a condo in a larger complex, so the shift from having no neighbors to neighbors was striking. As well, her

family did not know any of their new neighbors in Ramallah, whereas they knew all of the people in their small village in Jordan. Due to the perceived danger of living in a larger city surrounded by neighbors whom they did not know, Jamileh's mother determined that it would be inappropriate for her daughter to go outside like she used to in Jordan. The fear of something happening to her led her mother to impose the idea in her that going outside is *eib*. Jamileh's story shows that her family's move from rural Jordan to the city of Ramallah affected the spaces she was allowed to occupy within her house and neighborhood.

By making the movement through space restricted, society ensures that women are restricted to domestic spheres. This framework of spatial relations regarding Palestinian women and their negotiation of shame in their lives was immediately apparent when I began to talk to women about their lives. Spatial restrictions varied among the various generations of women, yet the core areas of "traditional women's roles" remained the same. Women in all generations were expected to be restricted to domestic spaces. For younger women, the negotiation of spatial access is even greater than for women of previous generations. For example, younger women are expected to receive a formal education, often extending to higher education due to the poor job market and the economic instability that Palestine is experiencing. However, women in Palestinian society are also expected to stay within the "traditional sphere" or "domestic sphere," which, as Peake (1993) indicates, is the way that women are kept spatially confined. Shame ideologies in Palestine allow for this confinement to occur in a more systematic way. Shame places the responsibility on women to maintain spatial divisions. Therefore, shame becomes a vehicle for maintaining the social production of space.

Pierre Bourdieu (1990) analyzed how spaces are gendered in order to relate power differentials between men and women. Through this Bourdieu suggests that the code of honor

and shame is inscribed into the built environment (Bourdieu 1990, Ilahaine 2019). Most women in the older generation of my collaborators brought up the idea of spatial limitations in regard to shame ideologies. One older woman indicated that younger women are now beginning to push the boundaries that have been previously cemented. She stated that younger women are entering spaces that have formerly been banned to women in her generation, such as male-only coffee shops. Within the context of Palestine, male-only cafés are a stark example of patriarchal spatial separations. To briefly describe them, a male-only café is like any other coffee shop in Palestine. They serve coffee, tea, some food and hookah for guests to order and have tables and chairs both inside and outside the cafes. They look very similar to cafes that are frequented by both sexes. There is no explicit rule or regulation that strictly prohibits women entering the premises of these cafes; however, it is an unspoken social agreement that everyone in the society understands.

One evening when I was walking in the old city of Ramallah with one of my collaborators, who was in her early 20's, we passed one of the oldest male-only cafés in the city. She turned to me and said, "Do you see that place? We aren't allowed to go there. Do you know that?" I looked over at the café that was filled with men of all ages drinking from cups, playing cards, and smoking hookah and looked back over at her. I told her yes, I did know that we as women weren't allowed there, but asked why? She chuckled and said, "Isn't it ridiculous, but some women are starting to go there... it's mainly foreign women, they don't know any better." The café, within the context of Peake's spatial geographic theory, would be included in the framework of the "city" which is structured patriarchally to seclude women's movements to just the domestic sphere. These particular cafés provide a snapshot into traditional modes of spatial use, as the cafés themselves are older than the new cafés found around Ramallah. The preservation of these spaces as male-only helps to shed light on the way public space was formed

to ensure women's exclusion to the domestic sphere. Traditionally, shame was used as a mode of boundary setting in order to ensure women's seclusion to the domestic sphere.

In Ramallah, families control the spaces that their daughters are allowed to occupy, particularly when it comes to economic and educational opportunities. This can be equated to societal regulations on spaces women are allowed to occupy. As I stated above, younger women are now expected to receive a formal education to advance their economic opportunities. Young women are now told that they must receive a formal education. As Adely (2012) points out, many women who do seek out educational opportunities do so in the hopes of securing a more advantageous marriage. Theoretically, an education should be a gateway for a young woman in Palestine to enter the public sphere in a legitimate manner, devoid of shame. However, this does not always seem to be the case. Women are still being confined to the domestic sphere and responsible for a majority of the unpaid domestic labor in Palestine. Even after they receive their educations, women are not being seen as worthy of entering the public sphere.

It can be said that even with the efforts of obtaining an education to enter the public sphere, women still have to concede to shame ideologies regarding where they can go to get an education. Women are told by their families that they are only allowed to seek educational opportunities if said opportunities are close to home. One woman named Nadia, who is a 30-year-old Muslim from Jerusalem, stated that her family was open to her traveling to another country for her to receive an education. She equated her family's lack of spatial boundaries to open-mindedness. She said: "My family is open minded, *yanni*, open minded. I don't do anything. They let me travel, they let me study in a different country. They trust me and I don't do anything wrong." She then indicated that although her family is fine with her traveling, society is not. It is shameful/*eib* for a woman to travel and live away from her family if she is not

married. Nadia expressed her thoughts on social spatial restrictions when I asked her how *eib* impacts her life. She stated: “Sometimes, it’s regrets. [she regrets having to hide parts of her life] Like sometimes when I travel, I don’t tell very many people because I know how their ideas are. I know if I just travel, I try not to say anything or share on Facebook, to avoid their comments.”

Women’s use of public urban spaces, or lack of use more specifically, can be seen in itself as a spatial expression of patriarchy (Peake 1993). Peake argues that the form of patriarchy shifts depending on time and place. However, the crux of her argument, which builds on the work of Borsa (1990), revolves around what she refers to as “politics of location.” Peake’s interpretation of the politics of location is that the “places and spaces we inherit and occupy which frame our lives in very specific concrete ways, are as much a part of our psyches as they are a physical or geographical placement” (Peake 1993, 420). A place takes on the collective thought of a group of people, meaning that an ideological thought that occurs within the group therefore reflects itself on the space they occupy.

This theoretical framework can be seen in the use of public space in Palestine. In Ramallah, women are able to use public space; however, that use is dependent on the time of day. Every woman I spoke to indicated that it is considered shameful for women to be out when it is dark. For older women, the restriction on space when they were younger would sometimes extend to certain public places during the daytime. Farha (74 years old, Ramallah) stated that when she was younger, she could not go to shared public spaces, such as the cinema, without being accompanied by a male member of her family. The practice of being accompanied by a man in public spaces has shifted only slightly for women. In the daytime, women now are able to travel within the city with more ease; however, once it begins to get dark, women are expected to be accompanied by either their male family members or a group of other women. They are never



to travel at night alone. This is an important aspect of spatial relations to recognize in terms of shame ideology because public space embodies gendered ideals. Space, in this sense, is male bodied and in order for women to access it, they must be granted access by a male bodied individual. When women are in these patriarchal spaces, as Peake phrases it, then they become an object that can be claimed by the natural inhabitants of that space, i.e. men. The fear for women's safety in public spaces at night directly correlates with the fear of the possibility that young women will use that space to interact with men whom they should not. People fear that their daughters and nieces will become objects that the patriarchal public space will use.

Before I begin to delve into this next section, I want to explain its importance and connection to *eib* in the context of space. As I stated before, the women whom I spoke to all came from different villages in Palestine. Although they all live in Ramallah now, the ways in which they were raised were influenced primarily by the villages where they grew up. Each village had its own unique set of social expectations and since the village one grows up in is instrumental to women's identity, so too is the social and political thinking of that village. As women from different villages moved to Ramallah, they brought with them the ways which they think and experience *eib*. Due to their understanding of *eib* coming from their upbringing, and the fact that many of them still have a lot of family back in their home villages, women expressed to me how *eib* in Ramallah is very different from *eib* in their village. One of the differences they mentioned had to do with spatial relations and *eib*. In this case, the politics of space that Peake discusses is also applicable when examining the way that Ramallah differs from other villages in Palestine. As I stated above, Ramallah is considered an "open city," a city where anyone has the ability to find success. It was pointed out by women that Ramallah was different from their home villages, particularly Nablus and Khalil (Hebron). Though both Nablus and

Khalil (Hebron) are three times the size of Ramallah in both landmass and population, these two villages are considered less advanced than Ramallah. This is where the politics of location is essential to understand. The mentality and philosophy of the people in both Nablus and Khalil (Hebron) is that of an older generation. They very much adhere to traditional modes of Palestinian thinking and that mode of thinking has become “as much a part of [their] psyches as they are a physical or geographical placement” (Peake 1993, 420). Therefore, spaces in the context of Nablus and Khalil (Hebron) are not the same as the space in Ramallah. However, I feel it is important to point out that the difference in space between Ramallah, Nablus, and Khalil (Hebron) concerns mostly public spaces. Domestic spaces, or spaces that women are usually contained to, are comparatively similar among the three places.

Expanding on Peake’s work, Gibson-Graham (1996) take a feminist approach to understanding class and social relations regarding space and its use. They state that “class defined as a social process is associated with particular ways of theorizing both society and political subjectivity... society is typically theorized as a homogenously or hegemonically capitalist formation centered on an industrial economy, with class theorized as a social relation originated at that center” (Gibson-Graham 1996, 57). When examining women’s spaces through the lens of capitalistic relations as the primary mode social reproduction, one realizes that women therefore are not vessels of social creation. Women are not deemed important enough to be producers of social relations because they are often delegated to the household or “domestic spaces.” Public spaces are inherently masculine, and the domestic sphere can therefore be considered inherently feminine. Women have been categorized within the domestic class which has “produced a surplus [of] labor in the form of use values that considerably exceed what she would produce if she were living by herself” (Gibson-Graham 1996, 66). Women produce

almost all of the unpaid labor force, making their contributions to social production invisible because only the paid labor force, according to some theorists, account for the total social and cultural production within a certain society. However, women are in turn affected by the decisions of the larger patriarchal capitalistic structure, which is, by virtue of its design, meant to keep women oppressed and in a place that men and the patriarchy deem suitable.

Palestinian women's changing role in the 21<sup>st</sup> century has presented challenges that previously did not exist. The expectation that Palestinian women continue to be the keepers of the domestic sphere and now active participants in the public sphere has forced women into a constant tug of war. Their responsibilities in the domestic sphere, to domestic spaces, are seen to be women's unwavering first priority. However, as I will explain further in the next chapter, the economic crisis that exists in Palestine has forced women to enter the work force to help support their families. Yet, most jobs that women will work, particularly in Ramallah, exist solely within the public sphere, or the masculine sphere. As I stated above, it has been considered *eib* for women to enter the public sphere without being accompanied by a male relative. Yet, since more women have to work, this has slightly changed, but not without the understanding of which public spaces women are allowed to enter. Women are often told which jobs are deemed acceptable for women to take: often, certain jobs are considered *eib* for women because they are considered "male" jobs, meaning that the physical spaces where those jobs are performed are considered masculine. This also ties closely with the type of education a woman is allowed to pursue, specifically, which degrees are considered acceptable for a young woman.

Peake's third point is that "inequalities are deeply embedded in the design and organization of urban spaces, embodied, as they are, not only in the sexual division of labour in the family (and in waged employment) but also in the system of urban settlement planning and

various state policies, such as the provision of child care” (Peake 1993, 417). Women are responsible for the reproductive labor power in both the home and the community. They also have to keep relations between agencies of collective consumption, such as health and welfare, and housing (Peake 1993, 147). In particular, Palestinian women are responsible for the physical wellbeing of their children, particularly their daughters.

### **Bodies as Space**

Another aspect that Gibson-Graham focus their attention on is the idea of bodies as spaces. They state that “feminists exploring the social construction of the female body have questioned the centrality of the phallus, or its lack, in governing the actions of the embodied subjects” (Gibson-Graham 1996, 95). Feminist geographers further examined how the female body has been a subject of the patriarchal spatial control. Female bodies are made into social sites that are subject to the scrutiny of patriarchal ideologies. I found this to be especially true for women in Palestine. Women’s bodies are just as much spaces that dictated by shame ideology as the larger spaces around them. Thinking about women as space allows for a better understanding of how ideology their lives physically. As well, they are seen as pliable modes of social elevation for men in society because they are providing the means and support for continuing a capitalistic society. Gibson-Graham explain that one’s body is a social location which a “multitude of social, political, physiological, and discursive practices” can be interpreted (Gibson-Graham 1996, 96). Palestinian women’s identities are comprised of all the struggles that surround them. The social, political, and physiological, and discursive practices allow for differing interpretations of the Palestinian women’s physical person by differing parties. For example, within Palestinian society, women are often referred to as a part of the landscape. Girls are named after villages and

landmarks to further make the connection between women as physical spaces for which meaning can be ascribed.

Every woman I spoke to indicated that their bodies were governed by shame ideologies. They stated that they do not have control over what they can do with their bodies because there are always rules and regulations that will immediately stop them from straying away from social norms. Particularly, women's bodies are regulated through shame by dictating what they can or cannot wear. Women's clothing choices must specifically cater to the ideology of society. If they do not, then women are unable to move through public spaces because their individual choice goes directly against what the patriarchal structures deem as admissible.

For instance, Abeer told me a story of how she one time posted a photo of herself on the internet. She said that one of her aunts deemed that her outfit was inappropriate and decided to call Abeer's mother to promptly let her know. Abeer's mother began to message her after she had a conversation with her aunt because Abeer's choice in outfit had created a huge problem for the family. They believe that the outfit was "too revealing," therefore Abeer was shamed because she made the incorrect choice about how her body could be presented in a public (online) space. The idea that shame is attached to what a woman puts on her body has existed for a long time. Older generations of women expressed that when they were growing up, women and girls were not allowed to wear anything that was masculine in nature, such as pants. Women would wear either western style dresses or traditional Palestinian garb, such as a *thobe*. As time went on, what women put on their bodies has shifted, yet there are always limitations. Women's bodies, therefore, can be viewed as spaces in which patriarchal ideals are imposed. Women's movement in space, and subsequently as space, is directed by the concept of *eib*. *Eib* creates and negotiates which space is deemed acceptable and how that space can be interpreted and used.

## Conclusion

With this chapter I explored the idea that *eib* ideology is closely connected to the concept of social spatial production. Palestinian women have traditionally been limited to an existence in the domestic sphere because the public sphere was limited to just men. Although this is changing, as I will show in the next chapter, women are still expected to negotiate their existence in the public sphere. *Eib* has been used as a tool to keep women in the domestic sphere, as well as a means to limit women's participation in the public sphere today. I also used this chapter to explain how women's bodies can be viewed as spaces in which patriarchal ideals are imposed. Women's movement in space, and subsequently as space, is directed by the concept of *eib*. Women as space within the context of *eib* ideology means that women's bodies are also spaces in which meaning is ascribed. *Eib* creates and negotiates which space is deemed acceptable and how that space can be interpreted and used. In this next chapter, I will explore how *eib* ideology has changed generationally.

## CHAPTER IV

### GENERATIONAL CHANGES

When I began to plan this thesis, even when it was just an idea, I knew that it was important to touch upon the ways which shame has changed for different generations of Palestinian women. I came to this conclusion for a variety of reasons, the first being from my own lived experiences. As a first-generation Palestinian born in America, I am very aware that each generation of women in my family (me, my mother, and my grandmother) thinks about shame in different ways. Even though we all have the same basis of thinking about shame, since we are all Palestinian and each generation taught the next what *eib* is, we still interpret it in different ways. I also decided to study shame ideology through the lens of generational changes because all scholarship I read related to shame ideology never looked at the ways in which it shifts and changes. I think this is a huge oversight because if the shifts in shame ideology aren't paid the proper attention, then gendered relations in Palestine will not make sense. What solidified my belief in this approach was when I went to Ramallah for an internship in the summer of 2018. The women I talked to during this time talked about the changes between generations frequently and cited it as an important aspect of Palestinian culture to understand.

As I stated in the introduction of this thesis, one of the main objectives of this research is to understand how and why shame ideologies in Palestine shifted across time and how do these shifts affect different generations of women in different ways. With this chapter, I intend to show a few key arenas that shame ideology has shifted in the lives of Palestinian women today. By

framing this question within a generational lens, I am attempting to show there is an acknowledged shift between the ways in which each generation both experienced and experiences shame. It is important to show that shame ideologies are not stagnant within the life of an individual woman. Within a woman's lifetime, she will experience varying degrees of responsibility to adhere to *eib* ideologies. As women age, their position within their community shifts to one of more authority. With this position, older women are allowed to experience a reprieve of sorts, as there are few, if any, people who are allowed to enforce *eib* ideology to them. However, they also take on a more active role in dispensing *eib* ideology to younger generations, as they are now seen as matriarchs in their families. Shame for Palestinian women not only shifts depending on one's age but also because of the time period and social consciousness which one lives in. It is essential to understand this because without the acknowledgement that *eib* ideology shifts (or even the acknowledgement that *eib* exists), any future attempt to understand the lives of women in Palestine would be outdated and futile.

### **Globalization**

When I asked women from all age groups why they think *eib* ideology is changing, almost every single woman brought up the idea of globalization. Some use the term specifically and others alluded to it. A woman named Nadia, who is 30 years old and from Jerusalem, stated she does believe that *eib* ideology is changing. I pressed by asking her why she thinks that is, more specifically. As she sat across from me, she studied my face for a moment with her eyes squinted, thinking and nodding her head. As she began to speak in a tone that indicated she was thinking through all of her words, she stated, "Globalization... They [women] think, they are reviewing the ideas and they are seeing [women are acknowledging past understanding of *eib* and looking at how those ideas impact their own lives]. Also, the older ideas and ways of



controlling people wasn't accepted that much, but there was reasons to obey the rules. But now the concept of freedom... People believe in it and they think about everything now. So they try not to judge everything.” With this statement, Nadia demonstrates that through various forms of access, such as technology, women in Palestine have the ability to connect and engage with more western ideologies.

This exposure allows them to reevaluate their daily lives through another lens. However, that does not mean that women in Palestine agree with or strictly adhere to western modes of thinking. On the contrary, women in Palestine use globalized ideas of feminism and women's empowerment and meld them into their own understanding of the world. The idea of “freedom” that Nadia discusses is a product of the conflated existence of both western and traditional Palestinian imagination. The way that “freedom” is defined in this instance is very important. It is important to acknowledge that “freedom” does not necessarily mean the same thing for all women everywhere. Saba Mahmood (2001) explores the notion of freedom and how it has been framed by liberal feminist scholarship as “negative freedom” or “positive freedom.” Mahmood explains that liberal feminist scholars refer to “negative freedom” as “the absence of external obstacles to self-guided choice and action” and “positive freedom” as “the capacity to realize an autonomous will, [which is] fashioned in accord with the dictates of ‘universal reason’ or ‘self-interest’” (Mahmood 2001, 207). However, she points out that with each of these definitions of freedom the individual actions are required to be the result of her “own will.” as opposed to being the product of “customs, traditions, or direct coercion” (Mahmood 2001, 207). Mahmood points out that it is important to acknowledge that self-realization is not a liberal invention and is something that has existed in pre-modern history in many forms (Mahmood 2001, 207). So, although they are influenced by western ideologies to some extent, women in Palestine do not

strive for a western conception of “freedom.” When women found out I lived in America, they would often express how they felt that Americans were too individualistic and lacked moral grounding. From what I was able to gather from their responses, a majority of the women I spoke with believe that “freedom” for them constituted the ability to get an education, to find a partner whom they loved, and to get the respect that they give to others.

As such, globalization does not necessarily mean the elimination of *eib* ideologies. In fact, globalization has created more nuanced avenues in women’s lives that bring new meanings and interpretations to *eib* ideology. Some practices that the west considers “female liberation” are explicitly looked down upon by Palestinian women of all age groups. Younger women are more sympathetic and receptive to western modes of thinking; however, they still abide by *eib* ideology because they realize that they live in a society that puts priority on one’s ability to adhere to tradition.

The women I interviewed also expressed that they look to other Arab countries to help shape their worldview. I found that women were more willing to follow what other Arab countries do more closely than they would countries that are considered more “developed.”

When I asked her specifically about why her thoughts on *eib* has changed, Nadia stated:

For me, I was all the time thinking about that [*eib*] but now I can express myself. Before, no; we just learn from parents, from school, from society. But when we get older, we think about all of the things we learned about and everything in our environment, everything is changing. Actually, the last 10 years...I think... what has happened in the Arab countries. All the Arab countries around us; everything is changing. So, this was associated [with *eib*], *yanni*, it comes with revolution. I notice... I have noticed, I have friends from Jordan, from different Arab countries. There is all the time, conferences and discussions. There is all the time discussions of what we used to be; what we can’t discuss, but discussing everything.

**Andrea:** So, do you think that it was more of this change in the Arab world that had created this change with *eib*?

**Nadia:** Hmm, yes, like changing everything *eib*. It's like [people are] thinking about everything. *Yanni*, reviewed and discussed and rational thinking is working now. *Yanni*, "why is this *eib*," this used to be *eib* but now no. They treat it before as *eib*. If it's really *eib* and wrong, we still saying it's *eib*. But like I told you, freedom and thinking, logic and globalization, many things are changing the ideas.

What Nadia is saying in this statement is that there is a constant flow of ideas among the various Arab countries and this has a lot to do with the revolutions associated with both the Arab Spring and the general cultural revolutions that have taken place throughout the Middle East.

Globalization has allowed for more ease of communication, particularly through technological advancement, which I will discuss below.

### **Technology**

While Palestinians have stayed up to date with technological advancements, I found that there are two pieces of technological invention that have had the largest impact on *eib* ideology. The first is the internet, which is the reason that people in Palestine have quick access to globalizing ideas. The second is the mobile phone. Ilahiane (2019) argues that the mobile phone is "an invaluable vehicle for inverting and suspending ordinary gender roles and placemaking practices" (Ilahiane 2019, 55). I found that this is true, as many of the women I spoke to expressed how the mobile phone has changed their everyday lives in a variety of ways. In today's cultural landscape, very few people use flip phones, and the women in Ramallah were no exception. When the mobile phone was brought up, women were unequivocally talking about the smart phone. The smart phone has transformed the production of *eib* in ways that the flip phone was never able: the ability for anyone to carry a small computer in their pocket has made it easier for people to interact both with one another and with previously unattainable content. In this sense, smartphones have transformed the space and place which shame occurs and has allowed for an alternative mode of transmission of cultural and social ideals. As I will show later in this

section, the virtual world that exists within the smartphone duplicates and reconfigures existing social boundaries. Ilahiane points out that the cell phone is not necessarily just an object in this case but something else that “constitute multi-vectored places” (Ilahiane 2019, 55). For the women I spoke to, their phones were windows to the world outside of Palestine. Particularly because of the apartheid, their phones allow them to communicate with family and friends around the country (or other countries) whom they cannot see in person due to blockades and travel restrictions from the Israeli government. Their phones therefore create a new space in which they can interact without the barriers of the apartheid.

Due to the privacy that a cell phone provides for an individual, older generations often view the devices as opportunities for *eib* waiting to happen. With the ubiquity of smart phones, parents nowadays do not know exactly what their children are doing or whom they are talking to, so there is the assumption that they are participating in behavior that would be considered *eib*. For example, parents think that a cell phone allows their girls to talk with boys in private, which in the physical world would be considered *eib*. This anxiety was particularly acute for Reema, a 38-year-old from Khalil (Hebron), who is illiterate. Her concerns for her daughter, who is around 14 years old, centered around her daughter’s use of her cell phone. She stated (translated by interpreter):

Her daughter uses the phone a lot in the evening, even until 3am and she didn’t know about [it], and so many times she caught her and she took the phone. But she can’t read or write, so she didn’t know what she was doing on the phone. So, the next day her daughter was afraid she would tell her father. So, she asked her “what were you doing?” and she said she was writing stories and sharing them. She is not talking to anybody. She explained to her that this is wrong because this may lead her to talking with somebody and loving somebody and so it’s not acceptable that she stays late and talks to anyone, even if she is just writing stories and sharing them because she is not sure what she is going to do. And she told her husband too that she likes to read and writes stories. But she didn’t again let her take the phone or stay up late. She doesn’t want [her] to listen to anything wrong. She is protecting her because she is just 14 years old. She doesn’t want

this to lead to her knowing anyone or doing something wrong or taking pictures on the phone and sending pictures.

Reema's illiteracy creates more anxiety around shame for her daughter because she does not have the ability to fully know what her daughter is doing on her phone. The fear she has of the unknown forces her to assume that her daughter will do something wrong, thereby shaming her for potential actions. A 21-year-old woman from Khalil (Hebron) named Noura expressed sentiments that conveyed similar thoughts. We were discussing how she thinks of shame in different ways than her mother and grandmother. She held up her phone to me and stated,

This phone, for my grandmother it is shame to use it as a girl, under certain age, it's shame to use it. For my mom, its ok. But, um, if your age over 15 or 16 it's ok to use it, but under this level [age] it is shame for my mother. But for me it is ok, there is no problem. It's useful on our life. So, everybody can use...they are afraid, girls, call some guys at night, or be in a relationship. [They will say] Ok, it's shame, don't give her a mobile. But they only think about the negative things that could come from it."

Technology has also reinvented the ways that young women combat shame ideology through their use of social media. One night during my fieldwork, I was sitting with a group of women on a balcony drinking tea. I was at one of my aunt's houses, so my visit did not necessarily have to do with my fieldwork, and I was just enjoying the company of my aunts and their friends. I was sitting directly next to one of my cousins and about halfway through the night she let out a laugh and then told me to look at her phone. On it showed a conversation taking place on Facebook's messenger app. The conversation was written in Arabic and as my Arabic is not fluent, I asked her what it said. She explained that she was randomly messaged by a man she did not know. His messages were sent in an attempt to persuade her to date him. However, once anyone clicked on his profile, it became very apparent that he was married and had children, and this was an attempt to cheat on his wife with a younger woman. My cousin laughed again when she saw my shocked face and simply said "watch this." She took a screenshot of the conversation

and opened up an already established message in her app. She attached the photo she took and began to type furiously. I sat there confused as to what she was doing until she finished typing and turned to me to explain. She then told me that the group she just sent the message to was comprised of young women who all attend the local university. This group message's specific objective is to expose the married men who message them. When a married man messages anyone in the group, the woman who was messaged attaches the conversation and ask if anyone knows him and his family. The women in the group then use these messages and warning for themselves and their friends to avoid this man and they will also message the man's family to let them know what he was up to. From what I saw, this group was comprised of hundreds of women.

In this instance, young women are able to use social media to circumvent any attempts of future shame on their part. Due to their ability to save conversations on their phones, women can provide proof that will automatically exonerate them from any accusations that they were participating in shameful behavior. The existence of technology that allows women to instantly communicate with one another is unique to this day and age. Technology has allowed for the creation of a new space these women can inhabit. However, I believe something that can be overlooked in this case is how young women's use of new technology actually mimics the older ways that women communicated with one another in the past. Traditionally, women would gather with one another to discuss improprieties in the community by going to one house where they would have tea or help prepare meals (Abu-Lughod 1986; Gorkin and Othman 1996). Younger women, with the help of technology, have extended that traditional meet-up to a digital level. Technology has been a crucial element in the shifting of shame ideologies in the lives of Palestinian women. It allowed for the reimagining of the platform which monitoring and

enforcement of shame takes place. Women now have the ability to stop the possibility of their own shame from happening. Yet, technology also creates a new space that shame can attach itself. This has a lot to do with the anonymity which technology allows its user to obtain. In other words, technology has allowed for both the reinforcement and resistance of shame ideologies.

### **Education**

Education, particularly access to education for girls, has shifted drastically in Palestine within the last 100 years. Previously, girls were not expected or allowed to receive an education as their obligations were centered around marriage and family affairs. Young girls who did have to fortune of obtaining an education often were from wealthy families. Fida Adely (2012) explores the way that school systems have changed for women and girls in the Middle East. Although Adely examines the daily life of school aged girls in Jordan (many of the families she discussed in her book are Palestinian-Jordanian), I believe her analysis is also applicable to Palestine. She states that the shift in education practices has a lot to do with the urbanization that has occurred in the region for the past century. This urbanization has led to an increase in educational opportunities for both men and women, which in turn has led to the increase of roles for women in public institutions and spaces (Adely 2012, 50).

I found that the most interesting aspect about education in Palestine is that there was a collective consensus as to the statistics of individuals who obtain an education. Every person I spoke to, both men and women, all expressed that 95% of the Palestinian population is educated. The specificity of the percentage was what I found most interesting. Whenever education was brought up, it was almost an automatic fact that everyone was trained to say. I'm not particularly sure where this number comes from, but due to its specific nature, I theorize that there must be

literature passed amongst Palestinians that comes from some political organization, possibly the Palestinian Authority.

Although this number does seem extraordinarily high, I do believe that there is a drastic difference as to the number of individuals who completed their education than in previous generations. According to the United Nations, the number of Palestinian youths enrolling in school has increased 940% from 1993 to 2011 (Koni, Aida et al. 2012, 2328). It is also estimated that the number of Palestinians attending higher education institutions has exponentially increased. It is reported that the “estimated number of students attending HEI [higher education institutions] in 1993 was 22,750 [and] it rose into 213,973 in 2011” (Koni, Aida et al. 2012, 2328). From that number of students, 57% of them were female (Koni, Aida et al. 2012; Nicolai 2007). I believe it is safe to assume that the number of students has increased from 2011 as a larger emphasis on education has been pushed onto the social consciousness of Palestinians. In women who were 65 years and older, women were told that they were not allowed to go to school because that was not their role. It was considered *eib* for a woman to put her education before her marriage prospects. As women were expected to marry at a young age in that generation, women had to be home, learning from their mothers and preparing for married life. However, often women did not even have the choice to get an education as their families would forbid it. Jamileh, a 30-year-old Muslim woman from Khalil (Hebron), told me that, in Khalil, it used to be considered *eib* for a girl to go to university because there are men there. Now, women go to university without the fear of being stopped because of the presence of men. Education now is seen as something that is vital to the development of young women. A young woman who has an education is seen to have better marriage prospects than a woman who does not. If a



family has educated children, then in the eyes of the community, they are respectable and seen as economically stable.

However, the effort to obtain an education still presents many challenges for women. The desire to receive an education, even with its elevated status society, does not necessarily matter all of the time. Particularly when schooling forces a girl to travel some distance, families deem education non-essential. A girl or young woman traveling alone, regardless of the purpose of the travel, is seen as *eib*. Girls and women traveling alone presents a security problem for many families. If something happens to her, then it is her fault because she was alone, and women should know that being alone in the streets is not acceptable. As well, many families believe that if a woman is left alone, she will automatically participate in behavior that is considered *eib*, like meeting with men. Noura told me a story of one of her cousins who lives in a refugee camp near Jericho. He cousin, who is a girl around high school age, wanted to attend school. However, the school she would attend was in another village outside of the refugee camp. Her brothers told her that she could not go to school because she would have to go to the center of the city where the school was located. Her family forced her to stay at home and relinquish her ability to receive and education for the sole reason that women are not allowed to travel alone and there was no one available to take her to and from school every day. The restrictions on traveling to school is something that Adely (2012) explained as a precaution parents and families in Jordan take to ensure that the respectability of their daughters is upheld.

Not being able to travel to receive an education was a concern that most women brought up. A 20-year-old Muslim woman named Haneen from Jerusalem told me about her experience with this. She is one of nine children, to which is in the middle and her older siblings are all boys. Her older brothers were allowed to leave Palestine to peruse their higher education in other

countries in both Europe as well as in the United States. Haneen attends one of the local universities, but she told me when she was in high school her parents explicitly promised her that she could also leave Palestine to attend university. However, during her last year of high school they had a change of heart. It was the point where she already received a full scholarship to a university in Turkey that they told her she was not allowed to go. They decided, because she is a young, unmarried woman, she should not be in another country alone. They were afraid of what other people would say about the family because it is *eib* for women to live away from their families before marriage. Women do not have a choice in the matter because it is considered *eib* for women to go against their family after they already decided on something.

Even when women can get a university education, the subject that they choose to study also affects their standing in society. Another 20-year old name Yasmine (Ramallah) discussed how her family does not like that she has chosen to study English at the local university. She said that her father wanted her to become a lawyer, but she had no desire to pursue that career. However, it was her mother who stood up for her and supported her decision to study English. I found that women's success in receiving an education often occurred because of the efforts of her mother. If a young woman's mother did not support her daughter going to school, then typically the daughter would not go to school. Muna told me about her own experience with this as both an individual and as a mother.

They always complained about, you know, me deciding and telling them, not the other way around. But that's how they got to see me developing and how my life changed and now after getting married, my children like the way they are. Like my youngest girl, she went to school in Cyprus, she studied there. So, people were telling me, "how could you send her? She's still in 9<sup>th</sup> grade." And my other daughter was doing her B.A. in the States. "What a mother," they said to me, "to give up, you only have two daughters! She's so young!" I said yes, this is better for her. I'm giving her more opportunities. I said I don't care! If I were to stop them because society did not accept my daughters, at such an age because she's a girl. I said, "I'm her mother, I'm her mother." I know what to

do. I know what's good for her and I'm happy that the result is rewarding in the end, and to encourage many others. So, sending your daughter away does not mean you're giving [taking away] all of the support. You know as a mother you take care of her despite the fact that she's away, you check on her. You let her sort her own character; her own personality. And she turned out to be a successful person in the end. So, everyone, I'm sure, they want their children to be that way. It's the technique. You accept what society will say or if they will point at you. So, it's up to you to decide. That's what I keep telling everyone. It's you who decides. You should not wait for the society to give you go for your right, you ask for it, if you wait for it. Rights are not given, they are taken.

In the beginning of this vignette, Muna explained to me that she often would question the things that her parents would tell her were *eib*. She believes that if a woman wants to do something that will better her life, then she should do it. This sentiment is not very easy for many women in Palestine, which is something Muna acknowledged, and the backlash she received is all too common an occurrence for Palestinian woman. Women who allow their daughters to take advantage of educational opportunities outside the country are often questioned about their abilities as a mother. They are told they obviously do not care for their daughters or their well-being because no self-respecting Palestinian mother would allow her daughter to leave home for an education. As I stated before, it is considered *eib* for unmarried women to live on their own even in the same city where their parents live, so allowing one's daughter to leave the country to live is deemed unthinkable. However, as Muna indicated at the end of the vignette, her decision to allow her daughters to study in other countries has influenced the perceptions of people around her. Her case showed that her daughters turned out fine and because of their opportunities abroad, they became well-rounded, respectable women.

As I stated above, many young women are shamed by their families for the educational degree they choose to pursue. When I asked her if she thinks there are different expectations when it comes to women and men in Palestinian society, Zahwa recounted a story about her niece that perfectly encompassed this dilemma.

Of course! Even education. For instance [points at her husband], his brother, he has a girl. She got in a very good school actually. So, she wanted to study agriculture engineering. They refused... they not refused, they “convinced” her that this is not good for women. Which is, I thought, nonsense because you want to go to the farm, you have farmers, farmers are outside of the city, these aspects. Also another thing, his [her husband] sister Hanan, she has a girl and she wanted to be a lawyer and they convinced her that law is not good for women. Why? So these are some things that are imposed and sometimes they say “Ahh we didn’t pressure her, we didn’t say don’t go.” But they did their best to convince her that this is wrong and this is not good for her. Which is imposing things on her. In a direct way, tell her, “No, this is not good. You will not find a job easily, men take all the jobs, and you’ll pay less” and so on and so on. You’re convinced, “Oh, this is not good, I’ll be a teacher, its safer.” Even though she is clever. But there is a lot of... but there are judges now and inspectors. A lot of brave women. These are things that indirectly draw your road, draw you to things that you don’t need, you don’t want, and even don’t achieve. When you go to study other things. You may not achieve the career you wanted or dreamed of. Why?

Interference from a woman’s family will dictate her future. Women are told by their families that certain subjects of study are *eib* and therefore they need to pick something else to pursue. It is important to point out that although there has been a major transformation as to the way Palestinians think about education for women, there are still limitations that do not allow women to pursue certain educational paths. However, as Zahwa points out in the vignette above, as more women pursue their own educational direction the more exposure certain paths will receive, therefore taking away the fear that families feel. Once a woman can point to another successful Palestinian woman doing the job and getting the education she wants, then she is able to show her family that she too can be successful.

## Economy

In this section I will explore the ways women perceive the market as a transformative mechanism in their lives. Economics has played an intricate role in the changing landscape of shame ideologies in Palestine. Due to the apartheid, the economic crisis in Palestine has continued to worsen. The Palestinian labor market is inherently political in nature: “While

female labor supply is limited (low labor force participation and limited to certain sectors), the economy's absorptive capacity is also limited due to the restricted access to Israeli labor markets and Israeli restrictions on the exportation of Palestinian goods" (Daoud & Shanti 2012, 2). More young people in Palestine are unemployed than in previous generations. As the market continues to decrease, young people do not have many prospects for their economic futures. If they want to participate in the Israeli labor market, then they must obtain a permit to cross through the checkpoints on a daily basis. This permit is not guaranteed, and it can be taken away at any time. Therefore, employment is not guaranteed. The uncertainty of employment opportunities puts a huge strain on the domestic sphere, which is primarily run by women. To characterize this strain, the World Bank refers to Palestinian households as "shock absorbers," which are the entities that absorb economic shocks in the future (Giacaman et al. 2001, 128). The crux of this analysis is that Palestinian women therefore are the ones who bear the most burden in situations of displacement. The increased poverty and unemployment amongst Palestinians created a reality where women became the breadwinners (Giacaman et al 2001, 129).

The increase in women's education has allowed for them to partake in jobs which were not traditionally available to them. Traditionally, women in Palestine were expected to stay at home and take care of the house and their children. All the older women I spoke to indicated that growing up, they were responsible for helping their mothers with cooking and cleaning. Many of them did not have access to an education so the jobs that they did find often were unrecognized within the larger labor force. In smaller villages and refugee camps, this is still a reality for women today.

Many women come to Ramallah in hoped for better economic opportunities that are not available in their home village. Both men and women come to Ramallah in pursuit of better

economic opportunities; however, women in particular have benefited from the economic freedoms which Ramallah provides. Ramallah's newfound position as a lucrative metropolitan area has become somewhat of an oasis to people from villages in the West Bank. Not only does Ramallah offer women more, albeit marginal, economic opportunities than their village could provide, it also allows women to have more anonymity and therefore less possibility of shame associate with one's work. Some examples of occupations the women I spoke to hold are: marketing officer, accountant, office assistant, architect, IT specialist, teacher, municipality community specialist, etc.

I asked most women why they believed Ramallah offered them more opportunities than their home village. Muna succinctly states that:

Ramallah is a city of diversity, which is a sort of a liberal city, open. There is openness with a mixture of international. So, the environment, it is becoming more open. People are becoming more exposed, awareness. Women are taking more leading roles, in Ramallah in particular. Like if you look at the fact that there are so many NGO's, so many women are heads, so this is not the case in other cities because there are not NGO's. So, this openness, the environment you live in, is really a positive element and helpful for women, and helpful for us in Ramallah. That's why many graduates from the universities, they try to get some opportunities, to get some internship or work here so they can check and see if they can stay. It's a way to be a little bit more free and to express themselves.

The economic reality in Ramallah and the city's reputation as an "open city" has become a draw to many people around the West Bank. As Muna pointed out, many women experience more economic opportunities than they would in their home villages. During fieldwork, I heard about many instances of women coming to Ramallah on their own to find work. However, since it is deemed *eib* for a woman to live alone, some women will live in apartments with other women in the same position that they are. This allows for the women to ensure that they are each behaving appropriately and that they are all safe. Another reason women live in these arrangements is due

to the high housing prices in Ramallah. Although women find more economic opportunities in Ramallah, it is still expensive to live in the city.

Leila Farsakh (2016) uses a quote from a conference presentation given by anthropologist Sherene Seikaly (2014), in which Seikaly professes that “the economy can also be considered a discrete realm of resistance in the face of political exclusion as much as a locus for new political configuration that need to be analyzed rather than assumed as neutral” (Farsakh 2016, 56). In the case of Palestinian women, economic independence is used as a means to reduce the restrictions shame ideologies place on their lives. When women gain economic independence, or even when women contribute economically to the household, they are able to negotiate the way they are seen by their family and community. This is especially true when a woman has an education. An educated woman with a job is seen as a respectable and competent person in her community. However, this viewpoint is dependent on an individual family’s personal perspectives. With the economic crisis that is occurring, households would not be able to sustain themselves if women did not contribute economically. Women entering the economic market in Palestine now has a lot to do with its current state. This reliance of women’s economic contributions has made it possible for Palestinian’s to reimagine shame ideology boundaries. Although those boundaries still exist for women in many villages, they too are shifting slightly because of the travel that is required to obtain reliable work. Jamileh told me that many people from Khalil (Hebron) will come to Ramallah to work and then they will take Ramallah’s idea of  *Shib*  back to Khalil where people will internalize it and adapt parts of it.

### **Inner-Community Change**

I found that even with the realization that globalization is impacting traditional shame ideology, many changes are also coming from internal forces. This internal change could be

reduced to being a product of the other elements that I mentioned above. However, I found that these changes have more to do with women's personal life experiences than anything else.

Jamileh was one of the first women who fully brought this idea to me. We were discussing the reasons why *eib* has changed and I asked her if she thinks *eib* is shifting just because of outside influence. (Translated by interpreter).

When you travel, and the internet, and the wifi, and the globalization, it has an effect. But she says something interesting. That in Hebron, they used to make the girls marry like at 14 years old without education and they are experiencing a lot of problems and divorces and bad effects on the girls themselves. But now, they are experiencing all this, so the parents are changing. They want to educate their daughters, to be stronger, to not get married when they are so young. They will go to university, so as they can sustain themselves and they will be stronger, they can deal with life, with their problems. So, this is something that affects the *eib*.

In this vignette, Jamileh indicated that many women who were not able to receive an education and were married young are now refusing to allow their daughters to live the same life that they did. Their experiences of being mothers at such a young age, coupled with their inability to provide for themselves has left them with the hope that their daughters life could be different.

Although they are aware that they are defying traditional shame ideologies and they realize there will be repercussions from their community, they believe in the end it is important that their daughters are more self-sufficient than they were.

Two sisters, Nour (25) and Leila (23), whom I met by chance when I went to the café that Leila owns, told me of their own lived experience with the internal changes to *eib*. They are from Nablus and a majority of their family still lives there. Their family in Nablus are very conservative Muslims, so they both attended a Muslim girl's school in Nablus. Their mother Lydia, whom I met and got to spend some time around, was forced to marry the girl's father when she was just 14 years old. At the time I met her, Lydia was only 40 years old, meaning she



had Nour when she was 15 years old. The girls have a brother who is not much younger than them. Years ago, their parents got a divorce and Lydia experienced extreme shame from her community: ultimately, they believed that she was the one responsible for the divorce, even though this was not true. Lydia decided that for the betterment of herself and for a better future for her kids she would leave Nablus to seek out better opportunities. She moved to Ramallah where she began to attend the local university and obtained both her bachelors and her master's degrees. She is an artist, who has had her work in galleries all around the Arab world. Not only does she encourage her daughters to pursue whatever life they choose to live, she also is seen as a mentor for a lot of the other young women in Ramallah. Leila's café, which Lydia helps her run, has become a hotspot for young people, particularly young women in Ramallah. Lydia in a lot of ways has become a mentor to younger women and is an example of how women can determine for themselves the path their lives take. From her personal experiences and the hardships she endured, she is vocal about aspects of *eib* culture that need to change.

Another woman from Nablus named Nabila (21 years old, Muslim), told me how her mother's parents were very conservative and strict when it came to *eib*. Her mother would often sneak books to read because she wanted to get some form of an education. Just like Lydia, Nabila's mother was married young, but Nabila's parents are still married, and her mother still lives in Nablus. However, much to the disapproval of her family, Nabila's mother encouraged her to move to Ramallah so that she could pursue opportunities that she would never have in Nablus. Although this decision was made with great cost to herself and her own reputation, she did this because she wanted her daughter to have an easier life than she has had. Likewise, Suzanne (30 years old, Jerusalem) told me that younger women in Palestine today are more willing to push back regarding *eib* ideology. She said that young women now question

everything, and they are stronger than the previous generations, hers included. Young women now will more openly talk to one another about the ways which *eib* impacts their lives, whereas in previous generations, women would not bring it up. There is a saying in Arabic that states that “*eib is eib*,” meaning that even talking about *eib* is *eib*. Although the younger generation still abides by this rule, when asked, they are more willing to openly talk about *eib*. Even the willingness to discuss *eib* when pressed ensures that more Palestinian women are sharing new ways of thinking about the practice. The willingness of younger generations to openly discuss how *eib* impacts their lives has led to transformation in how women navigate *eib* ideology in their daily lives. It allows for a more comparative approach to understanding the system which they all experience and therefore allows for certain stigmas that exist to transform.

I think the most fascinating way that *eib* ideology is shifting through inner-community efforts is from women-led initiatives. Zahwa, who lives in Aboud, told me about a woman’s group she started in the village. She told me how she would meet with women in the village whom she was friends with and a lot of them did not have any means for making income because many of them lack a formal education. Zahwa, who did finish high school and has a good office job in Ramallah, realized that all of her friends had other skillsets that they could use to help elevate their economic status. Below I will show a portion of the conversation that took place between Zahwa and myself.

**Zahwa:** I know a woman, she used to work, she’s from one village, not this village, and her father was very bad actually, she was abused. He refused to let her continue the secondary school even though she was very, very intelligent, she got high scores. He said no, you need to get married, so he brought a husband for her and he told her this husband is well educated, he has a degree. She found out that he didn’t even continue his school. After she married him, this is not the only [thing wrong], he is a follower of his mother [meaning that he relies a lot on his mother]. And she thought that she imposed on him and he doesn’t want to give even money and she has 3 children. So, she said to him, I will go and find a job, raise my children. Then she came and cleaned at the office. But I knew

her when she was cleaning the office and studying in university. Sometimes I tried to help her more because she told me her story. She sometimes worked the cafeteria at the university. Last week, she came to visit me here, and she changed a lot, because she works now, she has a job, a good job and her children are grown up. She is a different person because she has continued her education, she has a job, and even her husband, if, she says, if he doesn't come to the house, she doesn't care. She has her own life, independent. There is a lot [it is a lot], but if she doesn't do that, she follows her husband, waited till he brings bread to her house and she doesn't do any effort, what's her life it be? What would her children they be? Even her children are the best in the school now. I give the women here examples of these women [women who become economically independent]. They can see that everybody can have an independent life, if she works for it, if she puts efforts. But in the beginning, she has to be convinced it's her right to do that.

**Andrea:** And that's the hard part?

**Zahwa:** This is the hard part. That's why I work with them on personality now. Last time, we talked about communication and how its important between woman to woman. Direct communication. We talked about self-confidence and how we gain self-confidence and how we use self-confidence. We talked about the different social subjects that impact us and we give examples...But the most important thing is to value different personalities and also use the good things of that personality for the sake of the community. So, these are the subjects that we raise. Sometimes they raise a lot of subjects [hardships] that they may face. The most important thing is that they are open, that they talk. They talk about themselves, about the difficulties that they is facing. This is very important because we are now 17 [her women's group has 17 members now], and now [they are] talking in front of me, talking to strangers who come. And talking about themselves in what's inside and get it out. So, the most important thing is that you know that there is a problem then you can fix it. And this is a problem for the women. Sometimes, they blame the society, they blame the husband, they blame the man. No, its in us, strength is in us, we just can get it out.

[Later in the conversation she discusses economics can help provide women with more choices in life, I asked about her collective]

**Zahwa:** Yes, locally based. Actually, I have a different view, which is that community can support itself. Even I work with donors but I don't believe donors will do a lot of impact. I feel that, I have a nice experience with one of the associations that become an investor. Because we wanted to have a kitchen here, you know for people, these women whose [who are] housewives but they want to do catering and cooking and so on. And we have nothing. So, we went to the organization in Ramallah. And we told them we need some assistance. Because I think donors impose their own agenda, the community can support itself. We went ok, we have an idea. Britain and the US started to do auctions for community work, not auctions for selling. [Zahwa and the women she works with to implement that idea to their own work]. So they [the Palestinian organization in

Ramallah] said, can you do a presentation and I said, yes I can. So I did a presentation about the kitchen, and why we want to do it and the impact on women if they start working on it, and we got 30,700 shekels. This is the first time, and not a lot of people came because it was the first experience and then we started to go for companies [local, Palestinian owned companies] that have, say refrigerators, and say, “please help assist us” because the community can’t. Somebody gave us an oven and now we have a big kitchen with no donors. But you know, this is a good approach what I’m doing. Now we are thinking of having a festival that will be pure community based. You need to change your thinking, if you still wait until donors give you money, nothing [will happen]. You need to let people pay not only money. You know, they can pay resources, people can give training, give things they don’t want; resources. There are places that are closed for instance that you can open, just have centers or whatever. You can have teenagers and university students who has a lot of enthusiasm and active, they are sources. These are all sources you don’t think, it’s not only money. Donors give you money. But with this money, they need to impose their own agenda.

**Andrea:** Do you think more people need to look at it like that?

**Zahwa:** They need to. Look at the US, they took all their money back, look what happened. But if you had a center here, that your community owns it, your people work, they work on it, the use it, they put all their efforts in it, nobody can ever threaten it.

**Andrea:** Do you think that needs to spread more? This mentality? Are you trying to spread it more to different villages?

**Zahwa:** We have now. We are going to other villages. There is a village here that has sabar (cactus fruit/ prickly pears), they have a festival for that on Monday and Tuesday. I convinced these ladies that I work with to have a small exhibition. And they put all the things they work on, they work at home sometimes. Some works cooking, embroidery, whatever they do. And then they have seven tables. Yesterday, I was meeting them, telling them how we need to [market], not only market, we need to do it in a certain way. How to package it, how to label it. I tried to explain to them a lot of examples [samples] on the internet and agreed on what they want to do and give them ideas on how to do it...they have two project ideas that we have, we’re going to work on it, without any donors. There is, I don’t know if you heard of it, about a [farm], its [in a village near] the wall. [a Palestinian man and woman] wanted to protect that land so he started to plant and to work on that land so [they] started to plant and to work on that land. I took the ladies two weeks ago to that village. They were clever to plant seasonal plants and what they have done is very important because they went to, for instance, ten people, 20 people and went “we are growing these plants which are organic and we’re trying to support the land and the farmers near-by,” because now they use the farmers. They give them whatever plants and they plant for them. they do a basket with seasonal [food]. You just have to pay 100 shekels for a month and every week you get to your door. You support the other farmers because these crops and you do something else, carrots or whatever, and we put it in that basket. Give you money, and you do the effort in your land. You see, so now they have a waiting list. From nothing! That means that the community can come

together and support each other. So these are examples, I took the ladies there and said look how clever they are; they think creatively. I'm convinced of that approach. And if you do that, sooner or later, the donors will be gone. And you need community programs, projects, because we do not have a government here. If people say we have one, this is a lie I think people have the same approach now...It's not just you have an idea, you need a network. For instance, if I want to do a project now, at least 50% will be with me. At least. So, if you want to do something, you need a network, then work. You can't do a project without networking, without a base, its nonsense.

I share this lengthy conversation between myself and Zahwa because it truly exemplifies how women in Palestine are beginning to support one another in an economic and social sense in order to help continually shift *eib* ideologies in their lives. Zahwa's women's collective has created a new space which women are able to openly discuss *eib* ideologies A space of this nature has not traditionally existed within Palestinian society in part because women were told that it was *eib* to discuss *eib*. As I stated earlier, *eib* ideologies are beginning to shift because of a more open mode of communication. Zahwa said that her group does not have an age limit, so the women who partake in the collective come from a range of ages and generations. Therefore, women of all ages have the ability to learn and grow from one another. Zahwa and the women in the collective are also using both education and, more specifically, economics to help transform *eib* ideologies. By obtaining the resources for women to pursue projects that help build capital, this collective is able to erase past stigma attached to women entering the economic sphere. As well, many of the women, particularly those over 40, did not have full access to a formal education, therefore they do not have the skills to enter the formal workforce. The objective of this collective is to help women in that specific situation. Even without a formal education, every woman has a skill set which can be monetized. Zahwa said that in its beginnings, the collective would cater food because many of the women were exceptional cooks and wished to earn money from cooking. As more women joined, more skills were being utilized. For example, some

women were skilled at *tatreez* (Palestinian embroidery), others make soap, or decorations; it truly depends on each women's skillset. With Zahwa's help, women in Aboud are beginning to become more financially independent. However, the truly unique aspect of this effort is that these women are transforming the way they think of themselves and other women around them through entrepreneurship. For Zahwa and all of her friends, this experience is just as much about dispelling and transforming the ideologies of shame in their lives just as much as it is about money. As shame is often passed from woman to woman, community initiatives that allow women to openly discuss their feeling are essential for the transformation of shame. Without open communication and encouragement, these transformations would not be possible.

### **Conclusion**

The objective of this chapter was to showcase the various ways which *eib* ideology has shifted and transformed among different generations of Palestinian women. I framed this analysis in a generational lens because I found that it was important to understand that shame is a transformative phenomenon that, even within a single woman's life, takes on different forms of embodiment and meaning. I chose to focus on five specific arenas of globalization, technology, education, economy and inner-community change because I found that these were the areas which all women indicated there has been significant change to *eib* ideology in Palestinian society.

Globalization has allowed for Palestinians to see other countries, particularly other Arab countries, ideas and customs, which then allowed for Palestinians to implement elements they favored into their own lives. Therefore, certain traditional Palestinian customs that were closely related to *eib* ideology have been transformed or viewed through a new lens. One such product of globalization is the implementation of technology, particularly the smartphone, in the daily

lives of Palestinian women. With new technological advancements, women now have the ability to stop the possibility of their own shame from happening. As I highlighted in the chapter above, technology also creates a new space that shame can attach itself.

The transformation of education is an important topic to discuss when understanding generational changes to *eib* ideology. Older women did not have the opportunity, nor the infrastructure, to attend school and school was considered *eib* for young girls and women. Now, school is seen as vital to the development of Palestinian girls and women. This is in part because a woman who is educated is seen as a status symbol within the community. As well, women who have educations have an easier time finding a partner to marry and are seen as more desirable than those women who do not have an education. Since in Palestinian society a good marriage is the ultimate goal for a young woman, families are taking every precaution to ensure that their daughters marry. However, women's education is also essential for women to enter the workforce, which is something that is expected. The economic situation in Palestine has made it difficult for families to survive off a one-person paycheck. Therefore, women are now expected to enter the workforce to support their families. Women are therefore able to use their economic contributions to renegotiate the previous restrictions placed upon them by *eib* ideology. When women gain economic independence, or even when women contribute economically to the household, they are able to negotiate the way they are seen by their family and community. Finally, I found that a lot of *eib* ideology is changing because of inner-community efforts. Older women, within both the middle and older groups I talked to, expressed how many women in their generations were forced to marry young and they did not want the same fate for their own daughters. Although they are aware that they are defying traditional shame ideologies and they realize there will be repercussions from their community, they believe in the end it is important

that their daughters are more self-sufficient than they were. Through my conversation with Zahwa, I showed how women are now bannng together to create community support systems among themselves. They now have the ability to freely discuss *eib* ideologies in their personal lives and compare how it also affects the women in their community. They are also able to create economic opporrtunities for themselves, even if they do not have a formal education, by utilizing the skills they already possess. This in the end empowers them more and gives them the ability to become more self-sufficient.



## CHAPTER V

### CONCLUSION

Throughout this thesis, I examined the ways which shame/*eib* ideologies impact Palestinian women's lives. I first analyzed how Palestinian women in Ramallah defined *eib* and how it is enforced in their lives. Through conversations with women, I was able to determine that *eib* is anything that goes against social norms and traditions. As well, many women expressed that *eib* for them is anything that society deems as inappropriate or wrong. This definition connects back to my first main thesis question of "what Palestinian women in Ramallah think about shame." Every woman indicated that they thought of shame as a phenomenon that has a lot of repercussions for women in Palestinian society. They believe that *eib* only affects women in their society. From the vignette I shared in Chapter 2, it was apparent that men in Palestinian society were also aware and agree that *eib* ideology primarily impacts the lives of women. Through this I was able to determine that *eib* is a deeply gendered phenomenon. Not only does *eib* help to reinforce gendered ideology in Palestine, it is also responsible in many respects for creating the very ideology it upholds.

The manifestation of *eib* ideology in women's everyday lives was another main question which I addressed with this research. Women expressed that *eib* pervaded their lives both consciously and unconsciously. Through their explanations I was able to determine that *eib* is a form of habitus in the lives of Palestinian women. It is so deeply entrenched in their daily functioning, that it difficult to pinpoint every arena of life which it impacts. With this thesis, I

attempted to shed light on just a few of the broader areas affected by this ideology. Enforcement of *eib* ideology is one question which is vital to understanding how *eib* ideology can take place and persist. With topics such as shame, previous research was quick to explain it by blaming its existence on male coercion. However, my collaborators made it extensively clear that male influence is not the reason they follow *eib* ideology, nor is it the means in which it is enforced. Women expressed that enforcement of *eib* ideology was perpetuated mostly by women themselves. Not only do women self-monitor their own thoughts and behaviors, but other women in their lives, particularly their mothers, are responsible for teaching and reinforcing *eib* ideology in the young women in their lives. It is important to note that shame occurs not just for things that have happened, but for things that have not happened or were never really ever going to happen in the first place. Therefore, self-monitoring is used as a tool to prevent shaming for potential actions.

I explored the significance of space in the third chapter of this thesis because it is an important component of how shame manifests in the daily lives of Palestinian women. Space, in the context of *eib* ideology, is an essential tool that is used to enforce and negotiate where women can and cannot occupy. *Eib* ideology, in the case of space, is essential to the formation of public and domestic space. Domestic spaces in Palestinian society have been, and still are, reserved exclusively as women's spaces, whereas public spaces are exclusively male. I found that with the progression of time, the negotiation of space has begun to transform along with other aspects of *eib* ideology. Before, public spaces were seen as inappropriate and it was shameful for women to enter those spaces. However, the newfound need for women to enter the formal economy has shifted the spaces that are deemed acceptable for women to occupy. *Eib* ideology is a tool which inscribes meaning into space, more specifically the built environment, in

Palestinian society. A place takes on the collective thought of a group of people, meaning that an ideological thought that occurs within the group therefore reflects itself on the space they occupy. Along with the physical built environment, women's bodies are also seen as spaces upon which *eib* ideology can be ascribed. Women's movement in space, and as I explained, subsequently as space, is directed by the concept of *eib*. As I previously stated, *eib* creates and negotiates which space is deemed acceptable and how that space can be interpreted and used.

Finally, I examined how and why shame ideologies have shifted across generations of Palestinian women. This question gets at the theoretical grounding of this thesis. Past research regarding shame in the Middle East never fully acknowledged the ways which shame shifts through time, or that it shifts at all. By ignoring this reality, researchers have ignored the lived experiences of Arab women of all ages and reinforced, whether intentionally or not, the idea that Arab society is stagnant. I found that the changes that have occurred in the way *eib* ideology is viewed and practice by Palestinian women is integral to the understanding of Palestinian society today. Not only has *eib* shifted with different generations of women, within a single woman's life, the meaning and reality of shame ideology in her life will change drastically as she ages. *Eib* presents itself in very different ways for a woman depending on her age. Within the final chapter of this thesis, I examined five arenas (globalization, technology, economy, education, and inner-community change) which have contributed to the shifting of *eib* ideology from generation to generation. Through my conversations with women, I found that these were key spheres which were continually brought up as most impacted by the changes to *eib* ideology.

I found that it was important to examine shame ideologies in the framework of generational changes because it allowed for a more thorough understanding of the composition of gendered realities in Palestine. As I stated above, globalization was a consistent theme that

came up in conversation throughout my fieldwork. Although globalization is often perceived as an exchange of ideas from the West to eager recipients in the East, many of the women I talked to discusses the ease in which the Arab world can exchange ideas with one another. *Eib* ideology exists within other Arab countries as well, but with the newfound ease of exchange with other Arab countries, Palestinians are now incorporating other ways of thinking about *eib* into their own practice of shame. This means that certain traditional Palestinian customs that were closely related to *eib* ideology have been transformed or viewed through a new lens. One of the main modes which new ideas are able to reach the people in Palestine is technology. As I showed, technology has allowed for Palestinians to interact with people both inside Palestine and outside of the country. Technology has also created new spaces which shame ideology can be perpetuated or where it can be circumvented. The next arena which shame ideology has drastically shifted is the education of women in Palestine. As opposed to in the past where it was considered *eib* for a girl to attend school, young girls and women are now expected to attend school. Now, a woman receiving an education is seen as a vital part of her development both because she is more equipped to enter the formal workforce and she becomes a more desirable marriage partner. Changing *eib* ideology surrounding schooling for girls has shifted the barometer for what a well-rounded respectable woman is considered in Palestinian society. The shifting of educational expectations for women has also impacted (and has been impacted) by the economic reality in Palestine. Due to the limited economic opportunities, women are being called upon to help contribute to their family's bills. This new ability for women to enter the workforce without the restrictions that older generations were subjected to has allowed for a shift in the way in which Palestinians think about shame and women's work.

Finally, I found that many components of *eib* ideology is changing because of inner-community efforts. Older generations of Palestinian women have begun to take stock of their own lives and realized that they did not want their daughters to live the same lives they did. Therefore, they are pushing for their daughters to explore more options, such as receiving an education, so that they can be more self-sufficient than they were. Through my conversation with Zahwa, I showed how women are now bannin together to create community support systems among themselves where they can now freely discuss *eib* ideologies in their personal lives and listen to other women's experiences with it. They are also able to create economic opportunities for themselves, even those who do not have a formal education, by utilizing the skills they already possess. This in the end empowers them more and gives them the ability to become more self-sufficient.

However, I want to take this opportunity to explore a case that shows how the transformation of *eib* ideology does not always benefit women in a positive way. After I left my fieldwork in Palestine to return to the United States at the beginning of August 2019, something happened that garnered a robust response from not only Palestinians, but people around the Arab world. Israa Ghayeb was a 21-year-old Palestinian woman from Beit Sahour, a part of Bethlehem, who was killed by her brothers and father in what is labeled as an "honor killing." Upon initial reports of the killing, it was said that the day before Israa was with her fiancé and a female cousin at a café, while there she and her fiancé took a picture together, which she then posted on the internet. Many news outlets reported that this was the reason she was killed, because of this picture. They stated that her brothers and father believed the picture was shameful, so they therefore tried to kill her at home, which did not work at first, and followed her to the hospital where they beat her to death. However, something they didn't realize was that a

member of the hospital staff was in the hallway recording the killing. In the recording, although I could not bring myself to listen to it, you can hear Israa being killed in a horrific manner. This caused a mass wave of protests throughout Palestine as the news of Israa's death traveled around the Arab world.

When I heard about Israa's death, I was deeply disturbed and became engrossed in the details of her case. As I read more and more about what happened, I felt that there was something missing in the reports and the details of the case began to not make sense to me. To start, it made no sense that she would be killed for taking a picture with her fiancé, especially since she has a cousin present at the time. From what women told me during my fieldwork, it is not in violation of shame ideologies for a woman to be pictured or go to a café with a man she is engaged to. As well, in this situation Israa did everything right. She had a female cousin with her so she was not alone with him and she was engaged to her fiancé through the approval of both of their families. So, for the media to deem it an "honor killing" because of a picture made no sense to me. Then I read something that unintentionally exposed the reasoning behind Israa's killing. Apparently, a few hours before the killing took place, another female cousin of Israa went to Israa's brothers and father and essentially taunted them. She accused them of not having control over Israa and allowing her to do whatever she wanted because Israa was the primary breadwinner in the family. Israa's father and brothers did not have jobs due to the economic crisis in Palestine, but Israa did. So therefore, she helped her family financially and according to the shifts in *eib* ideology, this is seen as a mark of a respectable woman. However, I believe the cousins taunting struck a nerve within the men because she was essentially exposing them for not fulfilling one of their three only duties as Arab men, which are to get married, have children, and

provide economically. They then killed Israa not because of any impropriety on her end, but because of their own masculine insecurities.

So, even when a woman is following *eib* ideology and is being a respectable member of their community, the threat men feel to women becoming more involved in previously sanctioned “male-only” spheres has created a tumultuous environment for women to navigate. With the changes in *eib* ideology for Palestinian women, comes another obstacle in the form of threatened Arab masculinity. I think it is dangerous for both scholars and the media to push the idea of killings such as Israa’s be labeled as “honor killings” because it puts the blame solely on the female victim. As shown through Israa’s case, women can do everything right, follow shame ideologies perfectly and be a respectable member of their community, and still get killed or hurt because men feel that women have become a threat to their standing as men. This killing was not an “honor killing” because nothing shameful took place. This killing and, many more like it throughout Palestine, are products of misogynistic framework that pervades the construction of Palestinian masculinity. These killings are not “honor killings,” but more appropriately, they are examples of the countless, nameless, faceless victims of femicide that permeates the Arab world.

I believe future work on *eib* ideology is essential to the continual understanding of Palestinian women’s gendered realities. With future research I would like to take the opportunity to go to the villages many of the women I talked to came from and explore how the women still living in those villages view *eib* ideology. It is important to understand the nuanced ways which shame shifts because not all women experience it in the same ways. I think a topic that should be address along with this one is the formation and understanding of Palestinian masculinity. As I laid out with this thesis, *eib* ideology is essentially a guidebook for women on how to live a respectable life. However, the formation of masculinity for Palestinian men does not operate

within these same parameters. If Israa's case taught me, and hopefully other scholars anything, its that there needs to be more of a concerted effort to understand Arab men's lives through a lens of gendered critique because when this is not done, instances such as Israa's killing are analyzed solely through the lens of female improprieties as opposed to threatened masculinity.

I would like to end this thesis on a more positive note. Palestinian women of all ages wish to live respectable lives. Women's ability to now receive an education and enter the economic sphere has shifted the expectations women have for their lives and the lives of the women who they love. Palestinian women of all ages live their lives to the fullest of their ability. They have dreams, ambitions, family and friends whom they love, hobbies, work. Although this topic does touch upon the darker parts of their lives, it is important to note that Palestinian women experience joy just like anyone else. The existence of *eib* in their life does not limit their happiness. As Muna puts it:

I am proud for being a Palestinian woman because I can see that being a woman is a point of strength and the fact that people might think that if you're a man you have better opportunities, I would say it's not true. It's not being seen and people realize women are more dedicated, more hardworking. If we believe in something, we really carry it out.



## REFERENCES

- Abdo, Nahla. 1999. "Gender and Politics under the Palestinian Authority." *Journal of Palestine Studies* 28(2): 38-51.
- Abu-Lughod, Ibrahim. 1988. "Territorially-Based Nationalism and the Politics of Negotiation." In *Blaming the Victims: Spurious Scholarship and the Palestinian Question*, edited by Edward W. Said and Christopher Hitchens, 193-206. London: Verso.
- Abu-Lughod, Lila. 1986. *Veiled Sentiments: Honor and Poetry in a Bedouin Society*. Oakland, CA: University of California Press.
- Abu-Lughod, Lila. 1989. "Zones of Theory in the Anthropology of the Arab World." *Annual Review of Anthropology* 18: 267-306.
- Abu-Lughod, Lila. 1991. "Writing Against Culture." In *Recapturing Anthropology: Working in the Present*, edited by Richard G. Fox, 137-154. Santa Fe: School of American Research Press.
- Abu-Lughod, Lila. 2002. "Do Muslim Women Really Need Saving? Anthropological Reflections on Cultural Relativism and Its Others." *American Anthropologist* 104(3): 783-790.
- Abu-Lughod, Lila. 2007. "Return to Half-Ruins: Memory, Postmemory, and Living History in Palestine." In *Nakba: Palestine, 1948, and the Claims of Memory*, edited by Lila Abu-Lughod & Ahmad H. Sa'di, 77-103. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Abu-Lughod, Lila. 2011. "Seduction of the 'Honor Crime'." *Differences: A Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies* 22(1): 18-63.
- Abu-Lughod, Lila & Ahmad H Sa'di. 2007. "Introduction: Claims of Memory." In *Nakba: Palestine, 1948, and the Claims of Memory*, edited by Lila Abu-Lughod & Ahmad H. Sa'di, 1-24. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Abufaeha, Nasser. 2009. *The Making of a Human Bomb: An Ethnography of Palestinian Resistance*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Adely, Fida J. 2012. *Gendered Paradoxes: Educating Jordanian Women in Nation, Faith, and Progress*. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press.
- al-Husseini, Jalal. 2000. "UNRWA and the Palestinian Nation-Building Process." *Journal of Palestine Studies* 29(2): 51-64.

- Allan, Diana. 2013. *Refugees of the Revolution: Experiences of Palestinian Exile*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Baxter, Diane. 2007. "Honor Thy Sister: Selfhood, Gender, and Agency in Palestinian Culture." *Anthropology Quarterly* 80 (3): 737-775.
- Borsa, Joan. 1990. "Towards a Politics of Location: Rethinking Marginality." *Canadian Woman Studies/ Les Cahiers De La Femme* 11(1): 36-39.
- Bourdieu, Pierre. 1966. "The Sentiment of Honour in Kabyle Society." In *Honor and Shame: The Value of Mediterranean Society*, edited by J.G. Peristiany, 191-241. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
- Bourdieu, Pierre. 1977. *Outline of a Theory of Practice*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Bourdieu, Pierre. 1990. *The Logic of Practice*. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
- Butler, Judith. 1988. "Performative Acts and Gender Constitution: An Essay in Phenomenology and Feminist Theory." *Theatre Journal* 40(4): 519-531.
- Challand, Benoit. 2006. "Civil Society, Autonomy and Donors: International Aid to Palestinian NGOs." *European University Institute* 20(1): 1-26.
- Connor, John W. 1977. *Tradition and Change in Three Generations of Japanese Americans*. Chicago, IL: Nelson-Hall.
- Crumbley, Delare. 2008. "Miraculous Mothers, Empowered Sons, Dutiful Daughters: Two Generations of Gender Practices in the Storefront Sanctified Church." *Anthropology and Humanism* 32(1): 30-51.
- Daoud, Yousef and Ruba Shanti. 2011. "Private-Public Sector Employment Choice and Wage Differential in Palestine: A gender Perspective." *Birzeit University MPRA Paper* 39782.
- Deeb, Lara and Jessica Winegar. 2012. "Anthropologies of Arab-Majority Societies." *Annual Review of Anthropology* 41: 537-558.
- Doumani, Beshara B. 1992. "Rediscovering Ottoman Palestine: Writing Palestinians into History." *Journal of Palestine Studies* 21(2): 5-28.
- Dubisch, Jill. 1993. "'Foreign Chickens' and Other Outsiders: Gender and Community in Greece." *American Ethnologist* 20(2): 272-287.
- Duncan, J. & Duncan N. 1988. "(Re) reading the landscape. *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 6(2): 117-126.

Elias, Norbert. 1989. "Shame and Repugnance." In *Social Theory Roots and Branches*, edited by Peter Kivisto, 414-419. New York: Oxford University Press.

Erakat, Noura. 2019. *Justice for Some: Law and the Question of Palestine*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Fadlalla, Amal Hassan. 2007. *Embodying Honor: Fertility, Foreignness, and Regeneration in Eastern Sudan*. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press.

Farsakh, Leila. 2016a. "Palestinian Economic Development: Paradigm Shifts since the First Intifada." *Journal of Palestine Studies* 45(2): 55-71.

Farsakh, Leila. 2016b. "Undermining Democracy in Palestine: The Politics of International Aid since Oslo." *Journal of Palestine Studies* 45(4): 48-63.

Feldman, Ilana. 2018. *Life Lived in Relief: Humanitarian Predicaments and Palestinian Refugee Politic*. Oakland, CA: University of California Press.

Friedrich, Paul. 1977. "Sanity and the Myth of Honor: The Problem of Achilles." *Ethos: Journal of the Society for Psychological Anthropology* 5(3): 281-305

Furani, Khaled & Dan Rabinowitz. 2011. "The Ethnographic Arriving of Palestine." *Annual Review of Anthropology* 40: 475-491.

Gabiam, Nell. 2012. "'When 'Humanitarianism' Becomes 'Development': The Politics of International Aid in Syria's Palestinian Refugee Camps." *American Anthropologist* 14(1): 95-107.

Georgis, Dina. 2007. "The Perils of Belonging and Cosmopolitan Optimism: An Affective Reading of the Israeli/Palestinian Conflict." *Psychoanalysis, Culture, and Society* 12: 242-259.

Gibson-Graham, J.K. 1996. *The End of Capitalism (As We Know It): A Feminist Critique of Political Economy*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.

Gilmore, David D. 1987. "Introduction: The Shame of Dishonor." In *Honor and Shame and the Unity of the Mediterranean*, edited by David D. Gilmore, 2-22, Washington D.C. American Anthropological Association.

Glick, Peter; Nuray Sakalh-Ugurlu; Gulcin Akbas; Irem Metin Orta; Suzan Ceylan. 2016. "Why Do Women Endorse Honor Beliefs? Ambivalent Sexism and Religiosity as Predictors." *Sex Roles* 75: 543-554.

Gorkin, Michael and Rafiq Othman. 1996. *Three Mothers, Three Daughters: Palestinian Women's Stories*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

- Haddad, Mohanna. 2001. "Palestinian Refugees in Jordan and National Identity, 1948-1999." In *The Palestinian Refugees: Old Problems – New Solutions*, edited by Joseph Ginat & Edward J. Perkins, 150-168. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Hale, Sondra. 2009. "Transnational Gender Studies and the Migrating Concept of Gender in the Middle East and North Africa." *Cultural Dynamics* 21(2): 133-152.
- Hammoudeh, Sameeh. 2014. "New Light on Ramallah's Origins in the Ottoman Period." *Jerusalem Quarterly* 59: 37-53.
- Hammoudeh, Doaa, Layaly Hamayel, and Lynn Welchman. 2016. "Beyond the Physicality of Space: East Jerusalem, Kufr 'Aqab, and the Politics of Everyday Suffering." *Jerusalem Quarterly* 65: 35-50.
- Harik, Ramsay and Elsa Marston. 1996. *Women in the Middle East: Tradition and Change*. New York, NY: Franklin Watts a Division of Grolier Publishing.
- Ilahiane, Hsain. 2019. "The Berber House of the World Leaked: Mobile Phones, Gender Switching, and Place in Morocco." In *Location Technologies in International Context*, edited by Rowan Wilken, Gerard Goggin, and Heather A. Horst, 54-66. London: Routledge.
- Inhorn, Marcia C. 2014. "Roads Less Traveled in Middle East Anthropology – And New Paths in Gender Ethnography." *Journal of Middle East Women's Studies* 10(3): 62-86.
- Jabareen, Hassan. 2013. "20 Years of Oslo The Green Line's Challenge to the Statehood Project." *Journal of Palestine Studies* 43(1): 41-50.
- Jamal, Amal. 2004. "Feminist Media Discourse in Palestine and the Predicament of Politics." *Feminist Media Studies* 4(2): 129-146.
- Jefferis, Danielle C. 2012. "The 'Center of Life' Policy: Institutionalizing Statelessness in East Jerusalem." *Jerusalem Quarterly* 50: 94-103.
- Joseph, Suad. 1994. "Brother/Sister Relationships: Connectivity, Love, and Power in the Reproduction of Patriarchy in Lebanon." *American Ethnologist* 21(1): 50-73.
- Kanaaneh, Rhoda Ann. 2002. *Birthing the Nation: Strategies of Palestinian Women in Israel*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Kandiyoti, Deniz. 1988. "Bargaining with Patriarchy." *Gender and Society* 2(3): 274-290.
- Khalidi, Walid. 2014. "Palestine and Palestine Studies One Century after World War I and the Belfour Declaration." *Journal of Palestine Studies* 44(1): 137-147.
- Koni, Aida; Zainal Khalim; Maznah Ibrahim. 2012. "An Overview of the Palestinian Higher Education." *International Journal of Asian Social Science* 2(12): 2322-2329.

- Lefebvre, Henri. 1991. *The Production of Space*. Blackwell: Oxford.
- Lampert, Bahareh. 2008. "Voices of New American Women: Visions of Home in the Middle Eastern Diasporic Imagination." PhD diss. University of Wisconsin-Madison.
- Latreille, Martin. 2008. "Honor, the Gender Division of Labor, and the Status of Women in Rural Tunisia: A Social Organizational Reading." *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 40(4): 599-621.
- Leis, Philip E. & Marida Hollas. 1995. "Intergenerational Discontinuities in Nigeria." *Ethos* 23(1): 103-118.
- Levi-Strauss, Claude. 2008. *Structural Anthropology*. Basic Books.
- Mahmood, Saba. 2001. "Feminist Theory, Embodiment, and the Docile Agent: Some Reflections on the Egyptian Islamic Revival." *Cultural Anthropology* 16(2): 202-236.
- Massey, Doreen. 2005. *For Space*. Sage.
- McDowell, L. 1999. *Gender, Identity, and Place: Understanding Feminist Geographies*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
- Newman, Katherine. 1996. "Ethnography, Biography, and Cultural History: Generational Paradigms in Human Development." In *Ethnography and Human Development: Context and Meaning in Social Inquiry*, edited by Richard Jessor, Anne Colby, and Richard A. Shweder, 371-394. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Nicolai, Susan. 2007. "Fragmented Foundations: Education and Chronic Crisis in the Occupied Palestinian Territory." *UNESCO International Institute for Educational Planning: Save the Children UK*. 1-159.
- Nsamenang, A. Bame & Michael E. Lamb. 2014. "Socialization of NSO Children in the Bambenda Grassfields of Northwest Cameroon." in *Cross-Cultural Roots of Minority Child Development*, edited by Patricia M. Greenfield and Rodney R. Cocking, 134-149. New York: Psychology Press.
- Nofal, Mamdouh; Fawaz Turki; Haidar Abdel Shafi; Inea Bushnaq; Yezid Sayigh; Shafiq al-Hout; Salma Khadra Jayyusi; and Musa Budeiri. 1998. "reflections on Al-Nakba." *Journal of Palestine Studies* 28(1): 5-35.
- Peake, L. 1993. "'Race' and Sexuality: Challenging the patriarchal structuring of urban social spaces." *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 11(4): 415-432.
- Peteet, Julie. 1986. "Women and the Palestinian Movement: No Going Back?" *MERIP Middle East Report* 138: 20-44.

- Peteet, Julie and Barbara Harlow. 1991. "Gender and Political Change." *Middle East Report* 173: 4-8.
- Pina-Cabral, Jo o de. 1989. "The Mediterranean as a Category of Regional Comparison: A Critical View." *Current Anthropology* 30(3): 399-406.
- Qarmout, Tamer & Daniel Beland. 2012. "The Politics of International Aid to the Gaza Strip." *Journal of Palestine Studies* 41(4): 32-47.
- Rabinowitz, Dan. 2002. "Oriental Othering and National Identity: A Review of Early Israeli Anthropological Studies of Palestinians." *Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power* 9(3): 305-325.
- Rashidian, Mitra; Rafat Hussain; and Victor Minichiello. 2013. "'My Culture Haunts Me No Matter Where I Go': Iranian-American Women Discussing Sexual and Acculturation Experiences." *Culture, Health, & Sexuality* 15(7): 866-877.
- Rasmussen, Susan. 2007. "Revitalizing Shame: Some Reflections on 'Changing Idioms of Shame: Expressions of Disgrace and Dishonour in the Narratives of Turkish Women Living in Denmark'." *Culture & Psychology* 13(2): 231-242.
- Rassin M.; Klug E.; Nathanzon H.; Kan A.; Silner D. 2009. "Cultural Differences in Child Delivery: Comparisons between Jewish and Arab women in Israel." *Nursing Review* 56: 123-130.
- Rockwell, Susan. 1985. "Palestinian Women Workers in the Israeli-Occupied Gaza Strip." *Journal of Palestine Studies* 14(2): 114-136.
- Sa'di, Ahmad H. 2002. "Catastrophe, Memory and Identity: Al-Nakbah as a Component of Palestinian Identity." *Israel Studies* 7(2): 175-198.
- Said, Edward. 1978a. *Orientalism*. New York, NY: Vintage Books.
- Said, Edward. 1978b. "The Idea of Palestine in the West." *MERIP Reports* 70: 3-11.
- Said, Edward. 1979. "The Question of Palestine." *New York Times*.
- Sanbar, Elias. 2001. "Out of Place, Out of Time." *Mediterranean History Review* 16(1): 87-94.
- Scheff, Thomas J. 2000. "Shame and the Social Bond: A Sociological Theory." *Sociological Theory* 18(1): 84-99.
- Schwartz, Theodore. 1975. "Reflections among Generations in Time-Limited Cultures." *Ethos* 3(2): 309-322.

Seikaly, Sherene. "Social Man: Palestinian Capitalists and Economy" (paper presented at New Directions in Palestinian Studies: Political Economy and the Economy of the Political symposium, Brown University, Providence, Rhode Island, 1 March 2014).

Shalhoub-Kevorkian, Nadera. 2012. "Trapped: The Violence of Exclusion in Jerusalem." *Jerusalem Quarterly* 49: 6-25.

Shalhoub-Kevorkian, Nadera. 2015. "The Politics of Birth and the Intimacies of Violence Against Palestinian Women in Occupied East Jerusalem." *British Journal of Criminology* 55: 1187-1206.

Slyomovics, Susan. 1998. *The Object of Memory: Arab and Jew Narrate the Palestinian Village*. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Stein, Rebecca L. and Ted Swedenberg. 2004. "Popular Culture, Relational History, and the Question of Power in Palestine and Israel." *Journal of Palestine Studies* 33(4): 5-20.

Stewart, Charles. 2015. "Honor and Shame." *International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences* 11(2): 181-184.

Swedenberg, Ted. 1995. *Memories of Revolt: The 1936-39 Rebellion and the Palestinian National Past*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.

Taghdisi Rad, Sahar. 2015. "Political Economy of Aid in Conflict: An Analysis of Pre- and Post-Intifada Donor Behaviour in the Occupied Palestinian Territories." *Stability: International Journal of Security & Development* 4(1): 1-18.

Taraki, Lisa. 2008. "Enclave Micropolis: The Paradoxical Case of Ramallah/al-Bireh." *Journal of Palestine Studies*. 37(4): 6-20.

Vasquez, Jessica M. 2011. *Mexican Americans Across Generations: Immigrant Families Racial Realities*. New York, NY: New York University Press.

Ward, Christopher R. 2008. "The Intergenerational Field Needs More Ethnographic Research." *Children and Youth Services* 20(1-2): 6-23.

Yan, Yunxiang. 2016. "Intergenerational Intimacy and Descending Familism in Rural North China." *American Anthropologist* 118(2): 244-257.

Yarris, Kristin E. 2017. *Care Across Generations: Solidarity and Sacrifice in Transnational Families*. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press.

Yegenoglu, Meyda. 1998. *Colonial Fantasies: Toward a Feminist Reading of Orientalism*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Zoepf, Katherine. 2016. *Excellent Daughters: The Secret Lives of Young Women Who Are Transforming the Arab World*. New York, NY: Penguin Press.



APPENDIX A

APPENDIX A

Table 1 Interview Questions

Interview Questions	
1	How would you define and describe shame (eib)?
2	What do you think about shame (eib)?
3	What do people in your life typically feel shamed by?
4	Do you agree that these things are shameful?
5	Have there been any events or moments that have cause you to feel shame recently? What are they and how did you respond?
6	How does shame (eib) impact your life?
7	How was shame (eib) talked about while you were growing up?
8	Was it openly discussed? If yes, explain in what ways. If no, why do you think it wasn't talked about?
9	Was it talked about in a positive or negative way?
10	Who were the people who would discuss shame (eib)?
11	How does your idea of shame differ from your mother or grandmother?
11a.	What do you think about shame as a daughter?
11b.	What do you think about shame as a mother?
11c.	What do you think about shame as a grandmother?
12	How has your understanding/thoughts of shame changed over time?
13	Who can you use "eib" toward? In what situations? Tell me one or two situations where you can use "eib" towards another person.
13a.	Who can use "eib" to you? How do you respond to their use of the word?
14	Who taught you what shame is? Is this person close to you? Explain why they are important?
15	In what ways do you experience shame in your everyday life?
16	How is shame a part of your daily life?
17	How does the way you, as a woman, think about shame differ from the men in your life? Can you give me some examples?
18	Do you think you have different expectations than the men in your life? What are your expectations?
19	Why do you think the expectations are different for women and men?
20	What does it mean to you to be a woman in Palestinian society?
21	How are you expected to act as a Palestinian woman?
22	Why do you think the way you/the women in your community experience and think about shame has changed over time?
23	What are some specific elements of shame that have changed for you and your community? What do you think the cause of this shift has been?